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Article 
Financial Weapons of War 
Tom C.W. Lin† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Finance may be the most powerful weapon of war.1 It 
moves armadas, armies, and squadrons. It funds troops and ar-
tillery. It endows suicide bombs and improvised explosive de-
vices.2 It pays for special forces and mercenaries. It underwrites 
cease-fires and purchases surrenders. Finance is the weapon 
that makes all other weapons of war possible.3 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. 
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Ann Lipton, Duncan MacIntosh, Gregory Mandel, Shu-Yi Oei, David Post, 
Sasha Radin, Steven Sheffrin, Peter Spiro, Harwell Wells, and conference and 
workshop participants at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University, Seton 
Hall University School of Law, the 2015 International Committee of the Red 
Cross Workshop on Autonomous Legal Reasoning at Temple University, 2014 
Ontario Securities Commission Dialogue, and the 2015 National Business Law 
Scholars Conference for their invaluable comments, exchanges, and insights. 
Additionally, I am grateful to Thomas Helbig, Leslie Minora, and George 
Tsoflias for their extraordinary research assistance. Copyright © 2016 by Tom 
C.W. Lin. 
 1. See, e.g., IAN BREMMER & CLIFF KUPCHAN, TOP RISKS 2015 8–9 (2015) 
(discussing the weaponization of finance); NICK RIDLEY, TERRORIST FINANC-
ING: THE FAILURE OF COUNTER MEASURES 1 (2012) (asserting that money is 
an “essential component” of terrorist organizations); JUAN C. ZARATE, TREAS-
URY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL WARFARE 1 (2013) 
(“[M]oney is what fuels the operations of the world’s rogues.”); Shima 
Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480–82 (2014) (de-
scribing the sums of financing needed by terrorist organizations). 
 2. See, e.g., JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE 
COMMISSION 19–30 (2004) (describing the financing necessary for terrorist ac-
tivity, including Central Intelligence Agency estimates that al Qaeda spent 
approximately $30 million annually in the lead up to the September 11th at-
tack). 
 3. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2255, ¶ 6, 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2255 (Dec. 22, 2015) 
(alluding to the importance of financing in warfare); FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 
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This Article is about the financial weapons of war, their 
growing importance in national affairs, and their wide-ranging 
effects on law, finance, and society. This Article offers an early, 
broad examination of the realities of modern financial warfare.4 
This Article descriptively and normatively explores the new fi-
nancial theater of war, analyzes the modern arsenal of finan-
cial weapons, highlights emerging legal and policy concerns, 
and proposes key recommendations for current and future fi-
nancial warfare.  
While policymakers, analysts, and scholars have long been 
studying the respective, evolving fields of modern finance and 
modern warfare, there has been surprisingly little meaningful 
legal scholarship on the crosscutting realities of modern finan-
cial warfare. Drawing on a rich legal literature that spans the 
laws of war,5 finance,6 and cyberspace,7 this Article seeks to fill 
 
TERRORIST FINANCING 7 (2008), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/ 
reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf 
(“Funds are required to promote a militant ideology, pay operatives and their 
families, arrange for travel, train new members, forge documents, pay bribes, 
acquire weapons, and stage attacks.”); JIMMY GURULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR: 
THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 3 (2008) 
(highlighting the importance of finance in the war on terrorism). 
 4. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at ix–xiii (describing various efforts made 
by the United States in financial warfare following September 11, 2001). 
 5. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 163 (2011); Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Conven-
tion To Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 179 (2006); Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 817 (2012); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, 
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); 
Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight Dec-
ades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747 (2012); Matthew C. Waxman, 
Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 421 (2011); Jeffrey T. G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking into International 
Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of 
Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (2008). 
 6. See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 1247 (2014); Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial 
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012); Tom 
C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678 (2013); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an 
Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563 (2005); Saule T. Omarova, The Mer-
chants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 265 (2013); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200–04 
(2008); Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Fi-
nancial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673–79 (2010); Charles K. 
Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 7. See, e.g., CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (J. 
Ohlin et al. eds., 2015); SHANE HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE MILITARY-
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this understudied, underappreciated—yet critically im-
portant—legal intersection of war and finance. 
This Article has two chief objectives. First, this Article 
strives to offer an original preliminary understanding of the 
expansive effects of financial weapons of war and modern fi-
nancial warfare. Second, building on that new working under-
standing, this Article aims to identify and address larger, 
emerging normative consequences for law, finance, and society 
given contemporary realities relating to financial warfare. The 
objectives of this Article are largely conceptual in nature; as 
such, detailed discussions of issues pertaining to legislative 
language, policy execution, and political economy will be the fo-
cus of future work. In pursuit of its two chief objectives, this 
Article is mindful of a longstanding view that generally per-
ceives economic and financial hostilities as activities that fall 
below the threshold of warfare, but it argues for a different per-
spective under certain circumstances in light of developments 
in recent history.8 Jointly, this Article’s binary objectives do not 
seek to advance an elegant, comprehensive theory of financial 
warfare. Instead, this Article aspires to provide an early, work-
ing conceptual blueprint for thinking and acting anew about 
modern financial warfare. Such an endeavor to draw the dy-
namic and fast-evolving architecture of modern financial war-
fare will necessarily be a preliminary work-in-progress. None-
theless, it is a blueprint that must be sketched and studied, for 
the financial weapons of war have become too consequential 
and too important to ignore or wait for a later time.  
This Article unfolds this blueprint in four parts. Part I pro-
vides a general layout of the modern financial theater of war. It 
describes the modern financial infrastructure as a globalized, 
high-tech, American-centric system.9 It then identifies systemic 
risks, discrete vulnerabilities, and a lineup of potential adver-
 
INTERNET COMPLEX (2014); Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1011 (2014); Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 
GEO. L.J. 317 (2015); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1199 (1998); Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for 
Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023 (2007); David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); Nathan Alexander 
Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. L. REV. 1503 (2013). 
 8. See infra Part III.A.  
 9. See infra Part I. 
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saries in this financial theater of war. Part I provides a sweep-
ing survey of the emerging financial battlefield.  
Moving from general to specific, Part II highlights particu-
lar armaments of financial warfare. Rather than provide an 
exhaustive catalog of financial weapons, it offers a broad inven-
tory of the financial weapons of war. It classifies the financial 
weapons of war as analog weapons and cyber weapons. It ac-
counts for traditional weapons like economic sanctions, anti-
money laundering regulations, and banking restrictions, as 
well as digital weapons like distributed denial-of-service at-
tacks, data manipulation hacks, and destructive intrusions.10 It 
explains how these analog and cyber weapons are used in cur-
rent conflicts with al Qaeda, Iran, the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), North Korea, Russia, and Syria. Part II examines 
and explains the utility and evolution of these weapons in mod-
ern financial warfare.  
Part III contends with new concerns. It asserts that the fi-
nancial weapons of war present critical challenges for tradi-
tional laws and norms relating to financial hostilities, 
cyberattacks, and non-state actors.11 It argues that certain tra-
ditional rules that governed finance and war in the past are ill-
suited for a fundamentally different present, and a dramatical-
ly distinct future. It does so respectful of conventional norms 
and laws governing wars and armed conflicts, but mindful of 
the need to adapt to new realities. Part III grapples with core 
concerns posed by the financial weapons of war to certain fun-
damental principles governing war and finance.  
Part IV offers new pathways. It proposes three pragmatic 
policy recommendations that should be undertaken in the near 
term response to modern financial warfare while larger issues 
remain unresolved by global policymakers. It advocates for in-
novative cybersecurity incentives, advanced technological 
stress tests, and comprehensive financial war games to better 
prepare for threats in the financial theater of war.12 Part IV 
suggests immediate forward steps to be seriously considered 
while larger policy and legal disagreements are being deliber-
ated and debated by global policymakers.  
This Article ends with a brief conclusion. It reminds of the 
growing and emerging dangers of the financial weapons of war. 
And it signals, with hope and optimism, the possibility of tam-
 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
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ing the savageness of financial weapons, safeguarding the 
economy of the homeland, and promoting the integrity of the 
global financial system.  
I.  A NEW THEATER OF WAR   
The new theater of war is the modern financial infrastruc-
ture.13 This new theater of war presents an extremely valuable 
battle space for our adversaries because they may be able to 
plunder funds for their efforts and cause widespread financial 
panic and crisis simultaneously.14 Unlike previous wartime 
theaters, the financial theater of war is less defined by geogra-
phy and more by its critical functions, assets, and liabilities. 
The financial theater of war presents new risks, threats, and 
vulnerabilities for modern warfare posed by a cast of familiar 
and unfamiliar antagonists.  
A. THE MODERN FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The modern financial infrastructure serves as a new bat-
tlefield in contemporary warfare.15 In this new battlefield, in-
stead of bombs and bullets, the weapons of choice are financial 
and economic in nature.16 This new battlefield is the result of 
advances and developments in information technology, geopoli-
tics, and financial regulation over the last half century.17 The 
 
 13. See, e.g., ZARATE, supra note 1, at ix (“Over the past decade, the Unit-
ed States has waged a new brand of financial warfare, unprecedented in its 
reach and effectiveness.”); John Seabrook, Network Insecurity, NEW YORKER, 
May 20, 2013, at 64 (reporting on the growing number of cyberattacks on the 
American financial infrastructure). 
 14. See Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet 
Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 84 (2010) (“The international financial system is 
such a large target for cyberterrorists because of the substantial rewards that 
cyberterrorists stand to gain—from stealing large amounts of money to fund 
other terrorist acts, to crushing the global economy by shutting down the in-
ternational financial system, to more subtly affecting international markets by 
eroding consumer confidence.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Aiming Financial Weapons from Treasury 
War Room, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, at B1 (quoting Secretary of the Treasury 
Jacob Lew, who describes financial warfare as “a new battlefield for the Unit-
ed States”). 
 16. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at xi (characterizing financial warfare as 
one “defined by the use of financial tools, pressure, and market forces to lever-
age the banking sector, private-sector interests, and foreign partners in order 
to isolate rogue actors from the international financial and commercial sys-
tems and eliminate their funding sources”). 
 17. See ERIC J. WEINER, THE SHADOW MARKET: HOW A GROUP OF 
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modern financial infrastructure is an international, high-tech, 
American-centric theater of commerce and conflict.  
First, the modern financial infrastructure is an interna-
tional, interdependent system of intermediation.18 Finance con-
nects the world as a source of capital for good and ill. It con-
nects nation-states, private businesses, terrorist organizations, 
rogue syndicates, allies, and adversaries.19 Contemporary fi-
nancial participants and products operate in a complex, expan-
sive global network that connects and crosses institutions, in-
dustries, individuals, and instruments across the world.20 
Nation-states invest in one another through sovereign wealth 
funds and other vehicles. Commercial banks, investment 
banks, exchanges, pension funds, sovereign funds, mutual 
funds, and many other financial institutions are all intercon-
nected like never before, coexisting in an expansive financial 
ecosystem with numerous linked participants and products.21 
For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase, the largest American banking 
institution, serves as a nexus for a panoply of counterparties 
through a wide-ranging array of services and products that in-
 
WEALTHY NATIONS AND INVESTORS SECRETLY DOMINATE THE WORLD 17–25 
(2010). 
 18. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 643, 645–50 (2015) (discussing the core functions of financial 
intermediation). 
 19. See ZARATE, supra note 1 (“Money binds the world—now more than 
ever. It has always been a source of power for nations, companies, and people. 
It continues to be the lifeblood for terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates, 
and rogue regimes.”). 
 20. See, e.g., IAN GOLDIN & MIKE MARIATHASAN, THE BUTTERFLY DEFECT: 
HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES SYSTEMIC RISKS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
39 (2014) (“The global financial system has become more interconnected than 
ever before over the past decade due to policy and regulatory changes that 
have opened markets combined with the massive surge in computer power 
. . . .”); MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED—
AND HAVE STILL TO LEARN—FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 182–88 (2014) (dis-
cussing various linkages in the global financial system); Frank Partnoy, Fi-
nancial Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 799, 800 (2006) (describ-
ing the proliferation of new financial instruments). 
 21. See HAL S. SCOTT, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTER-
CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION (2012); Markus K. Brunnermeier, Decipher-
ing the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 77, 96–
98 (2009) (discussing the financial system’s “interwoven network of financial 
obligations”); Robin Greenwood & David S. Scharfstein, How To Make Finance 
Work, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2012, at 107; Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Inves-
tor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 493–94 (2015) (noting that many “new investment 
opportunities are linked in a complex, global web of interdependent institu-
tions and instruments frequently governed by crosscutting bodies of law that 
span multiple jurisdictions and regulators.”). 
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cludes investment banking, commercial banking, lending, mar-
ket-making, trading, clearing, custodial servicing, and prime 
brokering.22 In fact, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of 
Financial Research found that J.P. Morgan Chase was the most 
interconnected bank in the world and had more cross-
jurisdictional activity than any other bank in 2015.23 Addition-
ally, financial institutions play an important role in the global 
market for commodities that are essential to many non-
financial sectors of the economy like oil, aluminum, and coal.24 
In recent years, financial institutions like Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs physically held such large stakes of commodi-
ties like oil and aluminum that they could significantly influ-
ence the global prices for those commodities.25  
While the financial system has long been global in nature, 
geography matters much less now. In previous eras, the suc-
cesses and failures of one institution, state, or instrument were 
more readily contained and captured by borders and bounda-
ries. In present times, the ripples caused by one institution, 
state, or instrument move so much farther, quicker, and 
stronger than before.26 This was made bluntly evident during 
the recent financial crisis when volatility in the American mar-
kets for collateralized debt obligations and mortgage-backed se-
 
 22. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 
2013). 
 23. Paul Glasserman & Bert Loudis, A Comparison of U.S. and Interna-
tional Global Systemically Important Banks, OFF. FIN. RES. BRIEF SERIES 15-
07, Aug. 4, 2015, at 2–3. 
 24. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 
113TH CONG., REP. ON WALL STREET BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL 
COMMODITIES (Comm. Print 2014); Nathaniel Popper & Peter Eavis, Senate 
Report Finds Banks Can Influence Commodities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014, at 
B1. 
 25. See Omarova, supra note 6, at 311–23 (discussing the holdings and 
influence of financial institutions in connection with commodities markets).  
 26. See Austin Murphy, The Making and Ending of the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2009, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENC-
ES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 125, 128 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2010) (“The 
failure of just one large financial institution might lead to the failure of one or 
more other institutions that would then spread to yet more financial institu-
tions in a contagion that was feared might end in the collapse of the entire fi-
nancial system.”); Judge, supra note 6, at 659 (arguing that new linked prod-
ucts in the modern financial system generate new sources of systemic risk); 
David M. Serritella, High Speed Trading Begets High Speed Regulation: SEC 
Response to Flash Crash, Rash, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 433, 437 (not-
ing the potential perils emanating from “the interconnectivity of financial 
markets and their participants, as well as increased interconnections between 
securities and their derivatives”). 
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curities caused significant stress on the global financial sys-
tem.27 The more recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe, and its 
cascading effects around the world, offers even more credence 
to the notion of a global, interdependent modern financial in-
frastructure.28  
Second, in addition to being a global, interdependent sys-
tem, the modern financial infrastructure is also a high-tech 
system driven by new information technology and new commu-
nications technology.29 Complimentary advances in technology 
and regulation over the last five decades have remade the inner 
and outer workings of the financial system.30 Technological ad-
vances made computing power and capacity exponentially bet-
ter, faster, smaller, cheaper, and more readily accessible for 
everyone, including financial institutions.31 An Apple iPhone 
 
 27. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interven-
tions During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 7–16 (2011) 
(explaining the deleterious economic impact of collateralized debt obligations 
and mortgage-backed securities during the financial crisis); Kenneth E. Scott 
& John B. Taylor, Opinion, Why Toxic Assets Are So Hard To Clean up, WALL 
ST. J., July 20, 2009, at A13. 
 28. See, e.g., Clive Crook, Who Lost the Euro?, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, May 28, 2012, at 10; James Kanter, After Talks, Eurozone 
and Greece Fail To Settle Differences over Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2015, at 
B3.  
 29. See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COM-
PUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 70 (1999) (“Not only were the stock, 
bond, currency, commodity, and other markets managed and maintained by 
computerized networks, but the majority of buy-and-sell decisions were initi-
ated by software programs.”); MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET 
REVOLT 3–10 (2014); Markku Malkamaki & Jukka Topi, Future Challenges for 
Securities and Derivative Markets, in 3 RESEARCH IN BANKING AND FINANCE 
359, 382 (Iftekhar Hasan & William C. Hunter eds., 2003) (“At the end of [the] 
1990s, between 30% and 40% of all U.S. securities were channeled through the 
Internet and about 15% of all the U.S. equity trades were done on-line.”). 
 30. For a general discussion about the evolution of modern finance, see 
Robert DeYoung, Safety, Soundness, and the Evolution of the U.S. Banking 
Industry, 92 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 41, 41 (2007); Tom C.W. 
Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 572–76 (2014); Loretta 
J. Mester, Commentary: Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking Sys-
tem and the Process of Financial Intermediation, 92 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA 
ECON. REV. 67, 67–72 (2007); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of 
the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, 
and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 215. 
 31. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING 
TO OUR BRAINS 83 (2011) (“[T]he price of a typical computing task has dropped 
by 99.9 percent since the 1960s.”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thomp-
son, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 
101 GEO. L.J. 337, 347 (2013) (“Today, liquidity is now much more possible 
outside of traditional exchanges. In the new millennium, cheap information 
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today contains more computing power than all of NASA during 
the first lunar mission.32 Along a similar timeline, regulatory 
developments like Regulation Alternative Trading System,33 
Regulation National Market System,34 and decimalization35 
spurred the growth of electronic communication networks and 
alternative trading platforms that linked financial markets all 
across the globe.36 The net effect of the convergence of advances 
in technology and regulation is a high-tech, modern financial 
infrastructure.  
In today’s financial marketplace, smart machines powered 
by complex algorithms run much of finance.37 Financial tasks 
that previously required human teams to exert hours, days, 
and weeks of effort have gradually been replaced by artificial 
intelligence, algorithmic models, and supercomputers that per-
 
and low communication costs have expanded markets . . . .”); Chip Walter, 
Kryder’s Law, SCI. AM., Aug. 2005, at 32. 
 32. MICHIO KAKU, PHYSICS OF THE FUTURE: HOW SCIENCE WILL SHAPE 
HUMAN DESTINY AND OUR DAILY LIVES BY THE YEAR 2100 21 (2011). 
 33. See Regulation ATS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2015); SAL ARNUK & JO-
SEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND 
PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFI-
DENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 68–78 (2012); BRIAN R. BROWN, CHASING THE 
SAME SIGNALS: HOW BLACK-BOX TRADING INFLUENCES STOCK MARKETS FROM 
WALL STREET TO SHANGHAI 2 (2010); DAVID J. LEINWEBER, NERDS ON WALL 
STREET: MATH, MACHINES, AND WIRED MARKETS 31–64 (2009). 
 34. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.601 (2015); Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 49325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126, 11,160 (Mar. 9, 2004); see also SCOTT 
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, A.I. BANDITS, AND THE 
THREAT TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 49 (2012); Laura Nyantung Beny, 
U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory and Structural 
Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 399, 426 (“[T]he express purpose of the NMS [is] to promote efficiency 
and competition across secondary markets.”). 
 35. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON DECIMALIZATION 
4 (2012) (“Prior to implementing decimal pricing in April 2001, the U.S. equity 
market used fractions as pricing increments, and had done so for hundreds of 
years.”); CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO 
RULE OUR WORLD 185 (2012) (discussing how decimalization bolsters electron-
ic trading volumes and profits). 
 36. See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 33.  
 37. See, e.g., LEINWEBER, supra note 33 (chronicling the rise of new, elec-
tronic financial markets); Macey & O’Hara, supra note 6, at 563 (“Advances in 
technology, combined with the dramatic decrease in the cost of information 
processing, have conspired to change the way that securities transactions oc-
cur.”); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street As Community of Fate: Toward Finan-
cial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 430 (2011) (describing 
finance as “[a]n increasingly complex marketplace, [with] dependence on fast-
changing technology”); Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes, Bull vs. Bear vs. Bot, 
WIRED, Jan. 2011, at 90 (“It’s the machines’ market now; we just trade in it.”). 
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form those tasks exponentially faster, cheaper, and in a more 
user-friendly manner.38 High-frequency trading programs pow-
ered by artificial intelligence trade billions of dollars in securi-
ties and commodities across the world in fractions of a second 
without any human assistance in public markets, as well as in 
private dark pools.39 Autonomous supercomputers assist finan-
cial institutions in assessing risk and managing assets.40 Online 
brokerages and automated wealth managers empower retail 
investors to participate in finance like never before.41 Thus, it 
should come as little surprise that a financial institution, J.P. 
Morgan Chase, has recently been estimated to employ “more 
software developers than Google and more technologists than 
Microsoft.”42 In sum, the modern financial infrastructure is a 
high-tech system where information technology is at the core 
and foundation of the entire framework.  
Lastly, in addition to being international and high-tech, 
the modern financial infrastructure is an American-centric sys-
tem.43 Despite globalization and the emergence of other nation-
states, the United States stands as the lone superpower in the 
world. While geography may matter less in finance today, in 
terms of financial influence and economic clout, America re-
mains second to none. Our 2014 annual gross domestic product 
of $17.42 trillion leads the world.44 Our currency is the reserve 
currency of the world, and the most trusted investment during 
 
 38. See Lin, supra note 18, at 653–54. 
 39. See PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 46; Frank J. Fabozzi et al., High-
Frequency Trading: Methodologies and Market Impact, 19 REV. FUTURES 
MKTS. 7, 8–10 (2011); Graham Bowley, Fast Traders, in Spotlight, Battle 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at A1. 
 40. See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing 
of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 127, 130–35 (2009); Sheelah Kolhatkar & Sree Vidya 
Bhaktavatsalam, The Colossus of Wall Street, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
Dec. 13, 2010, at 62; The Rise of BlackRock, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2013, at 
13.  
 41. See ANN C. LOGUE, DAY TRADING FOR DUMMIES 196 (3d ed. 2014); 
John F. Wasik, Sites To Manage Personal Wealth Gaining Ground, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, at F10. 
 42. CA TECHS., HOW TO SURVIVE AND THRIVE IN THE APPLICATION ECON-
OMY 2 (2014). 
 43. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at xiii (discussing the “centrality of Ameri-
can financial power and influence”). 
 44. Data: United States GDP at Market Prices (current US$), WORLD 
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015). 
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times of distress.45 Eighty-one percent of the global trade fi-
nancing is conducted using the American dollar.46 Because of its 
importance, our currency is the most counterfeited currency in 
the world by criminals and rogue states.47 Our markets in debt 
and equity securities dominate the global capital markets. Our 
institutions—both public and private—such as the Federal Re-
serve, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), stock 
exchanges, and major investment banks are at the forefront of 
international financial policies and practices. As such, when 
America takes financial action, or when action is taken against 
American financial interests, it has global repercussions.48 For 
example, following the September 11th attacks, financial rules 
and regulations promulgated by the United States against ter-
rorism funding had a universal effect because of the unparal-
leled importance of the United States on the global financial 
system.49 
To be clear, while the financial infrastructure is American-
centric, it is by no means completely controlled by the United 
States. America’s financial power is stymied in part by the rise 
of other geopolitical powers like the European Union and Chi-
na. In fact, in 2015, China initiated the formation of the Asian 
Infrastructural Investment Bank with numerous international 
member states to serve as a financial counterweight to the 
United States.50 Additionally, a significant portion of America’s 
national debt is held by foreign nations, which has led national 
security experts like former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, to remark, “[t]he most significant 
threat to our national security is our debt.”51 Similarly, in a 
high-tech financial framework, American financial institutions 
and businesses face global competition and challenges, as sov-
ereignty matters less in the modern financial infrastructure.52 
 
 45. ZARATE, supra note 1, at 9. 
 46. BREMMER & KUPCHAN, supra note 1, at 9. 
 47. See FRANK W. ABAGNALE, THE ART OF THE STEAL 80 (2001) (“[T]he 
most counterfeited currency in the world is the American bill.”); DICK K. 
NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33324, NORTH KOREAN COUNTERFEITING 
OF U.S. CURRENCY 1 (2009). 
 48. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at 12. 
 49. See Richard Barrett, Time To Reexamine Regulation Designed To 
Counter the Financing of Terrorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 7, 10–11 
(2009). 
 50. See Jane Perlez, Rush To Join China’s New Asian Bank Surprises All, 
Even the Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2015, at A5. 
 51. ZARATE, supra note 1, at 413 (quoting Admiral Mike Mullen). 
 52. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge: Power in the Net-
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Rogue regimes and bad actors could attempt to undermine the 
American financial dominance through new financial arrange-
ments and the invention of new virtual payment systems.53  
In sum, while the United States is the dominant force in 
the modern financial infrastructure, other nation-states and 
non-state actors will undoubtedly continue to challenge and 
compete with the United States for financial and economic 
power in the coming years.54  
B. NEW RISKS, THREATS, AND VULNERABILITIES 
The modern financial infrastructure is both a valuable and 
vulnerable theater of war. Former Director of National Intelli-
gence Michael McConnell estimated that a successful attack on 
a large American financial institution “‘would have an order-of-
magnitude greater impact on the global economy’ than the 
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.”55 This new financial theater of war 
presents new crosscutting risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. 
These new dangers can be broadly conceptualized as systemic 
and discrete perils, though this distinction is frequently ob-
scured in many instances.  
1. Systemic Risks 
The modern financial infrastructure is subject to critical 
systemic risks and vulnerabilities due to its size, links, and 
speed.56 First, in terms of size, there exists the well-known sys-
temic risk of “too big to fail,” which has garnered much atten-
 
worked Century, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 94. 
 53. See generally PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF 
CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN AND DIGITAL MONEY ARE CHALLENGING THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2015). 
 54. See ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: TRANS-
FORMING NATIONS, BUSINESSES, AND OUR LIVES 82–89 (2014); ZARATE, supra 
note 1, at 385 (“Although the United States has had a near monopoly on the 
use of targeted financial pressure over the past ten years, this edge is likely to 
erode, leaving the United States both more vulnerable to external financial 
pressure and less able to use financial suasion as a lever of foreign policy.”); 
James D. Cox & Edward F. Greene, Financial Regulation in a Global Market-
place: Report of the Duke Global Capital Markets Roundtable, 18 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 239, 239 (2007) (“U.S. capital markets face more competition 
than in the past.”). 
 55. David E. Sanger et al., U.S. Plans Attack and Defense in Web Warfare, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A1 (quoting former Director of National Intelli-
gence Mike McConnell). 
 56. See Scott, supra note 6, at 673 (“Going forward, the central problem 
for financial regulation . . . is to reduce systemic risk.”). 
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tion in recent years.57 “Too big to fail” refers to the systemic risk 
where large financial firms become so integral to the stability 
of the economy that the state has to bail out these private firms 
with public funds when they are faltering.58 The existence of 
“too big to fail” firms presents large, important, and vulnerable 
targets in financial warfare. An attack on one or more of our 
large financial firms can cause significant damage to our na-
tional welfare. The Financial Stability Board has designated 
American financial firms like J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Wells 
Fargo as Systemically Important Financial Institutions.59 In 
2008, the failings of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers caused 
catastrophic economic stress at home and abroad.60 Had either 
of those firms failed because a foreign state or terrorist group 
attacked them, the economic and psychological damage would 
have been far more devastating.  
Second, in terms of links, there exists the systemic risk of 
“too linked to fail.”61 Because of the interconnected and interde-
pendent nature of the modern financial infrastructure, a dis-
ruption to certain firms and components that serve as im-
portant economic nodes in the system could lead to widespread 
 
 57. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY 
REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 15–
17 (2009) (reporting on the rise of too-big-to-fail financial institutions); 
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL 
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM 
CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 538–39 (2009) (discussing the policy challenges 
presented by “too big to fail” institutions); Tom C. Frost, The Big Danger with 
Big Banks, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304371504577406023330005352. 
 58. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1320.1(b) (2015); Amir E. Khandani et al., Sys-
temic Risk and the Refinancing Ratchet Effect 48 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 10-023, 2010) (“[S]ystemic risk . . . arises when large financial losses 
affect important economic entities that are unprepared for and unable to with-
stand such losses, causing a cascade of failures and widespread loss of confi-
dence.”). 
 59. FIN. STABILITY BD., 2014 UPDATE OF LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT BANKS 3 (2014).  
 60. See Bryan Burrough, Bringing down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 
2008, at 106 (detailing how speculation about Bear Stearns liquidity problems 
turned into reality and caused Wall Street to falter); Carrick Mollenkamp et 
al., Lehman’s Demise Triggered Global Cash Crunch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 
2008, at A1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids To Halt Financial Crisis Reshape 
Landscape of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1 (stating Lehman 
Brothers would seek bankruptcy protection after failing to find a buyer). 
 61. See Lin, supra note 6, at 711–17. 
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damage and a significant blow to investor confidence.62 Distinct 
from the systemic risk of “too big to fail,” the systemic risk of 
“too linked to fail” includes smaller institutions and instru-
ments whose distress or failure may ripple across the system 
because of their linkages, regardless of their value or size.63 For 
instance, in 1998, the Federal Reserve initiated a $3.6 billion 
private bailout for Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge 
fund with fewer than two hundred employees, because its de-
mise would have generated significant losses for many invest-
ment banks and caused widespread panic in the international 
financial markets.64 Since then, hedge funds and other financial 
intermediaries have only grown larger in size, volume, and im-
portance, further exacerbating the risks of “too linked to fail.”65 
In addition to hedge funds and other financial intermediaries, 
critical financial market components like clearinghouses, fi-
nancial data farms, and securities information processors also 
present vulnerable targets in the financial theater of war be-
cause they serve as essential links in a multiplicity of financial 
networks.66 In 2015, the temporary failure of Bloomberg termi-
 
 62. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, WHAT INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT CYBERSECURITY: HOW TO EVALUATE INVESTMENT RISKS 1–5 (2014); 
SCHMIDT & COHEN, supra note 54, at 151–52; Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 200; 
Waxman, supra note 5, at 424. 
 63. See FIN. STABILITY BD., ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFY-
ING NON-BANK NON-INSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2014); Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 200 (discussing the systemic 
risks caused by financial intermediation and disintermediation); Shen Hong, 
Everbright Fiasco Casting a Shadow, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2013, at C3 (re-
porting on the impact of a trading glitch at a medium-sized Chinese broker-
age). 
 64. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT xviii–xx (2000); FRANK PARTNOY, IN-
FECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MAR-
KETS 261 (2003). 
 65. See Whitehead, supra note 6, at 5 (“Although hedge funds grew by 
260% between 1999 and 2004 to become a one trillion dollar business, they 
were largely exempt from regulation under the federal securities and invest-
ment advisory laws.”). 
 66. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decou-
pling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663, 
691 (2008) (“The longer the ownership chain . . . the greater the potential for 
agency costs and valuation errors to creep in.”); Judge, supra note 6, at 685; 
Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 
101 GEO. L.J. 387, 389 (2013) (“Clearinghouses are stitched into the fabric of 
the financial markets and intrinsic to their operation.”); see also Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
211, 215 (2009) (“[S]uccessful systems are those in which the consequences of 
a failure are limited. This can be done by decoupling systems through modu-
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nals caused significant stresses in the global bond market af-
fecting billions of dollars in transactions.67 Bloomberg, it should 
be noted, is not a large financial institution, but an information 
services provider with about 325,000 terminals used by finan-
cial traders.68 Yet, because of its important connective role in 
today’s financial network, its proper function is crucial to the 
system’s linked stability.69 The same is true for many of the 
other critical connective institutions of our financial system. 
For instance, an attack on the systems of the publicly obscure, 
but critically important, Depositary Trust & Clearing Corpora-
tion, which clears trillions of dollars in transactions daily, could 
cause significant economic and psychological damage to our na-
tional welfare.70 Lest one thinks that such attacks on our eco-
nomic and financial infrastructure are farfetched and unlikely, 
two colonels of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army articulat-
ed using such attacks against the United States in a book about 
war strategy and tactics.71 
Third, in terms of speed, there exists the systemic risk of 
“too fast to save.”72 Transactions in the modern financial infra-
structure occur at velocities measured in the milliseconds.73 Bil-
lions of dollars move through cables and spectra across seas 
and states in fractions of a second.74 While these astounding ve-
locities can be beneficial in terms of efficiencies, they also in-
 
larity . . . .”). 
 67. See Nathaniel Popper & Neil Gough, Bloomberg Data Crash Puts 
Market in Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2015, at B1.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. See DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING CORP., SHORTENING THE SETTLE-
MENT CYCLE: MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK AND PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF 
THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2014). 
 71. QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE: CHINA’S 
MASTER PLAN TO DESTROY AMERICA 120–23 (2002). 
 72. See Lin, supra note 6, at 711–17. 
 73. See Fabozzi et al., supra note 39, at 8. 
 74. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3610 
(proposed Jan. 21, 2010) (acknowledging the accelerating speed of modern fi-
nancial markets); PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 46; A.D. Wissner-Gross & 
C.E. Freer, Relativistic Statistical Arbitrage, 82 PHYSICAL REV. E 056104 
(2010) (studying arbitrage opportunities for trading near the speed of light); 
Graham Bowley, The New Speed of Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at BU1 
(“Almost each week, it seems, one exchange or another claims a new record: 
Nasdaq, for example, says its time for an average order ‘round trip’ is 98 mi-
croseconds—a mind-numbing speed equal to 98 millionths of a second.”); 
Quentin Hardy, Testing a New Class of Speedy Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
22, 2013, at B1; Matthew Philips, Trading at the Speed of Light, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 2, 2012, at 46. 
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crease the risk of error, volatility, and market misconduct be-
fore anyone can intervene to prevent the damage.75 Further 
complicating the risks of “too fast to save” is the fact that many 
institutions engage in similar and interdependent strategies 
that are modeled on the same biases and assumptions.76 As a 
result, an attack on, or a failing of, one participant or one prod-
uct could create vicious cycles of volatility for the entire finan-
cial infrastructure as actions cascade and generate feedback 
loops and spillover effects of serious systemic, adverse conse-
quences.77 On May 6, 2010, the world witnessed an unprece-
dented stock market crash called the Flash Crash, which was 
allegedly caused by a single errant trade.78 In less than thirty 
minutes, approximately $1 trillion in market value vanished 
 
 75. See FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 43 
(2012) (“[O]ther studies show that during periods of high uncertainty . . . high 
frequency trading is associated with increased volatility and sudden, abrupt 
swings in the prices of stock.”); CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIV-
ING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 71 (1999) (discussing the tendency for 
failures or “accidents” to compound upon one another); Andrew G. Haldane, 
Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech at the International Economic 
Association Sixteenth World Congress: The Race to Zero (July 8, 2011) (tran-
script available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/ 
historicpubs/news/2011/068.pdf); see also Fabozzi et al., supra note 39, at 29 
(discussing how emphasis on speed and technology fragments the financial in-
dustry); Floyd Norris, In Markets’ Tuned-up Machinery, Stubborn Ghosts Re-
main, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013, at B1; Matthew Baron et al., The Trading 
Profits of High Frequency Traders (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://conference.nber.org/confer//2012/MMf12/Baron_Brogaard_Kirilenko.pdf 
(finding that high-frequency traders profit at the expense of ordinary inves-
tors). 
 76. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3611 
(“[M]any proprietary firms potentially could engage in similar or connected 
trading strategies that, if such strategies generated significant losses at the 
same time, could cause many proprietary firms to become financially dis-
tressed and lead to large fluctuations in market prices.”); Bernard S. Donefer, 
Algos Gone Wild: Risk in the World of Automated Trading Strategies, 5 J. 
TRADING 31, 32 (2010); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual 
Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the 
Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 810 (2010). 
 77. See BROWN, supra note 33, at 7; PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 9–10 
(discussing the financial dangers of “a vicious self-reinforcing feedback loop”); 
Louise Story & Graham Bowley, Market Swings Are Becoming New Standard, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A1. 
 78. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 1–6 
(2010); Graham Bowley, Lone Sale of $4.1 Billion in Contracts Led to “Flash 
Crash” in May, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at B1; see also Nathaniel Popper, 
Trader’s Arrest Raises Concern About Market Rigging, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2010, at B1 (discussing how the trading strategy known as spoofing contribut-
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from the U.S. stock market.79 While the Flash Crash was the 
result of an alleged programming error, it is not hard to imag-
ine foreign states and terrorist organizations attempting to 
cause havoc on the homeland through similar attacks on our 
high-speed, automated financial systems. For instance, with 
the proliferation of automated trading platforms, cyber crimi-
nals can cause significant financial damage to the homeland 
from the comforts of a remote location and without firing a sin-
gle shot simply by injecting bad data and false trades into the 
system.80 
2. Discrete Perils 
Beyond the systemic perils, the new financial theater of 
war also presents a multitude of discrete perils. The modern fi-
nancial infrastructure’s heavy reliance on computerized sys-
tems renders it particularly vulnerable to targeted 
cyberattacks.81 The Internet’s ubiquity means that any comput-
er that is capable of being connected to the Internet is vulnera-
ble to attack and malice.82 As the former Director of National 
Intelligence Mike McConnell observed: “[t]he United States is 
fighting a cyber-war today, and we are losing. . . . As the most 
wired nation on Earth, we offer the most targets of significance, 
yet our cyber-defenses are woefully lacking.”83 Many serious 
crimes and attacks against American corporations now involve 
computers as the weapons of choice and cyberspace as the pre-
ferred setting.84 For many companies, software codes, intellec-
tual property, and technological infrastructure represent some 
 
 79. Haldane, supra note 75, at 1. 
 80. See Michael Riley & Ashlee Vance, The Code War, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, July 25, 2011, at 50. 
 81. See Hollis, supra note 7, at 1042 (speculating about computer viruses 
that incapacitate stock markets); Scott Patterson, CME Was the Victim of 
“Cyberintrusion” in July, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2013, at B5; Riley & Vance, su-
pra note 80, at 52. 
 82. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN 
SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, 
2009–2011, at i (2011); Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1022 (“The Internet makes 
securing code much harder by exposing the inevitable bugs in software to sus-
tained scrutiny and attack. Many—if not most—computers are connected to 
the Internet directly or indirectly.”). 
 83. Mike McConnell, To Win the Cyber-War, Look to the Cold War, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at B1. 
 84. See BARRY VENGERIK ET AL., HACKING THE STREET? FIN4 LIKELY 
PLAYING THE MARKET 3 (2014); Riley & Vance, supra note 80, at 52. 
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of the industry’s most valuable assets.85 General Keith Alexan-
der, the former head of the National Security Agency and the 
U.S. Cyber Command in 2013, called the loss of American busi-
ness secrets and intellectual property to cyber criminals “the 
greatest transfer of wealth in history.”86  
Enemies of the state can initiate numerous tactical cyber 
strikes on American interests in the financial theater of war 
causing serious harms and significant damage.87 This was made 
alarmingly real by the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures, an Ameri-
can subsidiary of Sony Corporation, by North Korea.88 A num-
ber of similar cyberattacks have been made on American banks 
and other financial institutions by foreign states and rogue or-
ganizations.89 While the full measure of the costs resulting from 
such attacks is frequently hard to quantify, these costs are 
nonetheless real and potentially enormous, particularly the in-
tangible and psychological damages that fall out from these at-
tacks.90 Due to the amorphous and anonymous nature of 
cyberattacks—and the reticence of corporate victims to come 
forward—attribution, prevention, prosecution, and counter-
striking can all prove to be difficult.91  
 
 85. See BROWN, supra note 33, at 49 (discussing the urgent need for black-
box firms to safeguard successful strategies for as long as possible); David 
Barboza & Kevin Drew, Security Firm Sees Global Cyberspying, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2011, at A11 (“Cybersecurity is now a major international concern, 
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ing intellectual property.”); Alex Berenson, Arrest over Trading Software Illu-
minates a Secret of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, at A1 (noting the im-
portance of computer programs to financial institutions). 
 86. Seabrook, supra note 13 (quoting General Keith Alexander). 
 87. See Brown, supra note 5, at 182; Sean S. Costigan, Terrorists and the 
Internet: Crashing or Cashing in?, in TERRORNOMICS 113, 117 (Sean S. 
Costigan & David Gold eds., 2007) (noting the FBI estimated that cybercrime 
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ly executed, the result of the cyber strike would be the same as a conventional 
bombing raid but without the risk of civilian or military causalities.”); Sea-
brook, supra note 13, at 65 (“A large part of the nation’s financial infrastruc-
ture is under siege [from cyberattacks].”). 
 88. See Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Attack, First a Nuisance, 
Swiftly Grew into a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2014, at A1; David E. 
Sanger & Martin Fackler, Tracking the Cyberattack on Sony to North Koreans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015, at A1.  
 89. See infra notes 96–103. 
 90. See, e.g., JUNIPER RESEARCH, CYBERCRIME AND THE INTERNET OF 
THREATS (2015), http://106.186.118.91/201504/Cybercrime-and-the-Internet-of 
-Threats.pdf (estimating that cybercrime costs would be around $2  
trillion by 2019); Nicole Perlroth & Elizabeth A. Harris, Cyberattack Insurance 
a Challenge for Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2014, at B1. 
 91. See, e.g., MARK BOWDEN, WORM: THE FIRST DIGITAL WORLD WAR 48–
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Outside of the risks based in cyberspace, globalization has 
also created more discrete vulnerabilities for American finan-
cial interests. Major American corporations have significant in-
ternational footprints that can subject them to foreign economic 
pressures and threats. For instance, Caterpillar, the multi-
billion dollar manufacturer of heavy machinery based in Peo-
ria, Illinois, has operations in six continents, subjecting them to 
serious financial risks from foreign governments and non-state 
actors abroad.92 Similarly, Goldman Sachs, a New York-based 
investment bank, has offices in over thirty countries with fifty 
percent of their headcount and forty-two percent of their reve-
nues coming from outside of North America and South Ameri-
ca.93 Every international office or facility of an American corpo-
ration like Goldman Sachs and Caterpillar can represent a 
valuable target for our enemies in financial warfare, and an at-
tack on a significant foreign office or facility of a major corpora-
tion can cause significant economic and psychological harm to 
American interests. 
C. NEW AND OLD ADVERSARIES 
The financial theater of war presents a diverse lineup of 
new and old adversaries relative to adversaries of traditional 
theaters of war. In traditional warfare, nation-states with uni-
formed soldiers were the clear, predominant adversaries. In the 
financial theater of war, adversaries are less clear and more di-
verse. In modern financial warfare, antagonists include famil-
 
53 (2011) (describing challenges in creating a cybersecurity defense system); 
Sarah Gordon & Richard Ford, On the Definition and Classification of Cyber-
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iar foes like nation-states, but they also include less familiar 
foes like terrorist organizations, lone-wolf hackers, rogue em-
ployees, foreign corporations, domestic criminals, anarchists, 
and a host of cyber bad actors.94 Further complicating matters 
is the fact that a technologically interconnected world has led to 
the rise of cyber mercenaries willing to cause harm and havoc 
for the right price.95 
Episodes from recent history reveal the diversity of poten-
tial adversaries engaging in financial warfare. In 2011, hackers 
threatened Bank of America with stolen, corporate infor-
mation.96 In 2012, large, coordinated attacks, some attributable 
to Iran, dubbed “Operation High Roller,” targeted American 
and international financial institutions.97 In 2013, hackers infil-
trated the Associated Press’s Twitter account to falsely broad-
cast an attack on the White House that temporarily erased 
$136 billion in market value when automated programs traded 
on the bogus news.98 In 2014, it was revealed that Russian 
 
 94. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2009) (involving 
hackers who traded on illicitly-acquired, material, nonpublic information); 
DEP’T OF DEF., THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 9 (2015) 
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nancial institutions, and ideological groups often use hackers to further their 
political objectives.”); BOWDEN, supra note 91, at 48 (“Today the most serious 
computer predators are funded by rich criminal syndicates and even nation-
states, and their goals are far more ambitious.”); INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 
ALL., CYBER INTELLIGENCE: SETTING THE LANDSCAPE FOR AN EMERGING DIS-
CIPLINE 7–9 (2011); SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF 
MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 107–16 
(2010) (discussing the theft of trade secrets from hedge funds); Eric Talbot 
Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force 
Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 232 (2002) (allud-
ing to the difficulties of identifying a wide cast of potential cyber attackers); 
Michael Joseph Gross, Silent War, VANITY FAIR, July 2013, at 98; Nicole 
Perlroth, Hunting for Syrian Hackers’ Chain of Command, N.Y. TIMES, May 
18, 2013, at B1 (reporting on the difficulties of tracing hackers); Nathaniel 
Popper, Wall Street’s Exposure to Hacking Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 
2013, at B1. 
 95. See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 103–22 (discussing the market for cyber 
mercenaries); Matthew Goldstein, Need Some Espionage Done? Hackers Are 
for Hire Online, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2015, at A1. 
 96. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Facing a New Type of Threat from WikiLeaks, 
a Bank Plays Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, at B1. 
 97. See DAVE MARCUS & RYAN SHERSTOBITOFF, MCAFEE & GUARDIAN 
ANALYTICS, DISSECTING OPERATION HIGH ROLLER 3–7 (2012); Nicole Perlroth, 
Attacks on 6 Banks Frustrate Customers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2012, at B1; Ni-
cole Perlroth & Quentin Hardy, Bank Hacks Were Work of Iranians, Officials 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at B1. 
 98. See Amy Chozick & Nicole Perlroth, Twitter Speaks, Markets Listen, 
and Fears Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2013, at A1. 
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hackers infiltrated the NASDAQ computer system, and they 
continue to develop a sophisticated arsenal of cyber weapons to 
use against other nation-states.99 That same year, a group of 
cyber criminals dubbed as FIN4 hacked into the computer sys-
tems of Wall Street firms and other American corporations 
with the goal of stealing information that could affect the global 
financial markets.100 In 2015, it was revealed that an interna-
tional cyber gang systemically stole millions of dollars from 
over one hundred institutions around the world.101 Later that 
year, an international syndicate of traders and hackers were 
charged with operating a massive insider trading enterprise.102 
Furthermore, in recent years, China has been privately sus-
pected and publicly accused of serious cybercrimes against 
American interests.103 In fact, the United States took the ex-
traordinary step of indicting five Chinese military officials in 
2014 for hacking into U.S. corporations to commit espionage 
and intellectual property theft.104 
In addition to an expanding cast of external adversaries, 
financial institutions must also guard against potential inter-
nal adversaries.105 Rogue employees or contractors with author-
 
 99. See FIREEYE, APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE 
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NASDAQ, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 20, 2014, at 40. 
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2, 2014, at B1; see VENGERIK ET AL., supra note 84, at 3–4. 
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Malware, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2015, at A1. 
 102. See Sealed Indictment, United States v. Shalon et al., 15 Crim. 333 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015); Sealed Indictment, United States v. Murgio, 15 Crim. 
769 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2015); Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, 
Rogue Traders, Brazen Hackers and a Wave of Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 
2015, at B1. 
 103. See CHINA AND CYBERSECURITY: ESPIONAGE, STRATEGY, AND POLITICS 
IN THE DIGITAL DOMAIN (Jon R. Lindsay et al. eds., 2015); DENNIS F. 
POINDEXTER, THE CHINESE INFORMATION WAR: ESPIONAGE, CYBERWAR, 
COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL AND RELATED THREATS TO UNITED STATES IN-
TERESTS 83–112 (2013); Barboza & Drew, supra note 85; Julie Hirschfeld Da-
vis, Hacking Exposed 21 Million in U.S., Government Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 
10, 2015, at A1; David E. Sanger et al., China’s Army Seen as Tied to Hacking 
Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A1; David E. Sanger & Mark 
Landler, U.S. and China Will Hold Talks About Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 
2013, at A1. 
 104. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Mili-
tary Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Or-
ganization for Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us 
-corporations-and-labor. 
 105. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1050 (“[I]t is not technologically possi-
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ization and access can cause some of the most devastating 
damage to a country, its national security, and its financial in-
terests.106 Robert Hanssen, who spied for the Soviet Union and 
Russia for over twenty years, and caused the most destructive 
breach in domestic intelligence, was an FBI agent.107 Edward 
Snowden, who initiated one of the largest leaks of classified 
documents and defense programs in history in 2013, was a Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) contractor.108 Similarly, a rogue 
programmer or banker with access to critical infrastructure or 
operational software can cause havoc for the financial system.109 
In 2015, it was revealed that a Morgan Stanley financial advi-
sor allegedly stole over 300,000 confidential client account rec-
ords, and that information was later placed online for sale.110 
In sum, a diverse and expanding cast of familiar and un-
familiar foes in financial warfare makes this new theater of 
war one of the most challenging terrains for present and future 
battles.  
*   *   * 
Finance is the lifeblood of the American economy. Strong 
and stable financial institutions make for a stronger America. 
During the recent financial crisis when American investment 
banks were in distress, the entire economy and country suf-
fered.111 Venerable American corporations like General Electric 
had difficulties funding day-to-day operations.112 McDonald’s 
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BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 16, 2015, at 39 (reporting on the “insider threat” relat-
ing to cybersecurity from employees); see also MARK RUSSINOVICH, ROGUE 
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global financial panic). 
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TIMES, Jan. 6, 2015, at B1.  
 111. See SORKIN, supra note 57, at 417; Hui Tong & Shang-Jin Wei, The 
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franchisees struggled to get loans to make payroll.113 General 
Motors went into bankruptcy.114 And millions of Americans lost 
their homes, their jobs, and their peace of mind.115 Given the 
importance of finance to America and the intertwined nature of 
modern economies, it should be little wonder that the new the-
ater of war is the modern financial infrastructure, a place filled 
with new risks, threats, and vulnerabilities targeted by a cast 
of familiar and unfamiliar foes.  
II.  FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR   
The armaments of modern financial warfare are as vast, 
diverse, and important as the myriad of ways to raise and move 
money.116 Broadly, the financial weapons of war can be divided 
into analog weapons and cyber weapons, both of which can be 
used for offensive and defensive purposes. Analog weapons in-
clude policy actions, such as economic sanctions, anti-money 
laundering regulations, and banking restrictions. Cyber weap-
ons include distributed denial-of-service attacks, data manipu-
lation hacks, and destructive intrusions. Modern financial war-
fare often involves the concerted use of both analog and cyber 
financial weapons of war. 
A. ANALOG WEAPONS 
Analog financial weapons have long been used in connec-
tion with warfare to cut off funding for adversaries.117 Ancient 
Greek and Roman empires deployed financial and economic 
tactics to decimate their adversaries.118 As a young nation, the 
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United States imposed the Embargo Act of 1807 to maintain its 
neutrality in the war between Britain and France, as well as to 
punish the British.119 Later in the twentieth century, during the 
Cold War, the United States imposed a series of economic sanc-
tions against the Soviet Union and its Communist allies.120 In 
the days following the September 11th attack on the United 
States, the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1373 applicable to all member states, which 
required compliance with its International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.121 Additionally, the 
G7 nations, through their Financial Action Task Force, also 
adopted several recommendations against terrorist financing 
following September 11, 2001.122 Notwithstanding these efforts, 
terrorist organizations and rogue nations continue to use du-
plicitous and clandestine means to gain access to funding in the 
global financial system.123 As a result, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, despite all the technological advances in 
finance, analog financial weapons continue to play an im-
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portant role in the financial theater of war. Chinese military 
officials have openly discussed using financial warfare in inter-
national conflicts.124 The United States, as the lone financial 
superpower in the world, has creatively and effectively used 
many analog financial weapons against its adversaries.125 In 
the years following September 11th, the United States has 
made concerted efforts to choke off funding for terrorist organi-
zations like al Qaeda and ISIS.126 Similarly, it has used denial 
of access to the global financial system and economic sanctions 
to respond to aggression by North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Rus-
sia.127 Three general crosscutting categories of such analog 
weapons are worth noting: economic sanctions, anti-money 
laundering regulations, and banking restrictions.  
First, in terms of economic sanctions, nation-states have 
long used such policy tools as part of warfare and conflict, and 
they have become more prevalent in recent years.128 Economic 
sanctions are designed and intended to cause financial damage 
and distress to an enemy in a hot war or a cold war. Economic 
sanctions can be targeted against nation-states or specific indi-
viduals and institutions. The United States has had sanctions 
against North Korea since the Korean War in the 1950s.129 Eco-
nomic sanctions can include policies like asset freezes, import 
tariffs, trade barriers, travel restrictions, and embargoes.130 
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China has used embargoes of rare earth minerals, which are 
predominantly mined in China and crucial to electronics, to ex-
ert pressure on Europe, Japan, and the United States.131 More 
recently, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) has overseen a host of longstanding and new 
financial sanctions as a tool in modern warfare against Ameri-
can adversaries as varied as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, 
terrorist organizations, Mexican drug traffickers, and foreign 
nation-states.132 For instance, in 2014, the United States and its 
allies imposed a series of crippling economic sanctions against 
Russia and several Russian citizens following Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea.133 More recently, in 2015, due partially to eco-
nomic sanctions, Iran and the key stakeholders in the interna-
tional community reached a historic agreement that attempts 
to limit its nuclear weapons program.134  
Second, in terms of anti-money laundering regulations, na-
tion-states have been more aggressive and expansive in using 
such regulations to prevent the flow of ill-gotten gains and le-
gitimate capital towards funding terrorist and enemy war ef-
forts.135 Anti-money laundering regulations have placed finan-
cial institutions at the frontlines of financial warfare.136 
Financial institutions are now required to identify their cus-
tomers and report suspicious financial transactions to govern-
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ment authorities or they could be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion.137 Following the September 11, 2001 attack on the United 
States, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed. Title III of the Act 
focused on money laundering and terrorism financing.138 Addi-
tionally, post-September 11th, many nations joined forces to 
help prevent the flow of funds to al Qaeda through new anti-
money laundering regulations.139 For instance, the Group of Ten 
countries that manage the Society for Worldwide Interbank Fi-
nancial Telecommunications (SWIFT), which is used for a sig-
nificant percentage of global financial transactions, gave the 
United States access to its database to track and trace illicit 
flows of funds to terrorists and rogue nations.140 Documents 
found in Osama Bin Laden’s compound revealed that the global 
efforts to restrict terrorist funding had made it frustratingly 
more difficult for al Qaeda to raise and transfer money around 
the world.141 In current global conflicts with Russia, Syria, Iran, 
and North Korea, the United States and its allies continue to 
impose and enforce strict anti-money laundering regulations as 
a tactic against its adversaries.142 Furthermore, in the current 
battle against ISIS, one of the most well-funded terrorist organ-
izations in history, the Treasury Department’s anti-money 
laundering efforts, in particular efforts through its Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, are on the frontlines of this bat-
tle.143 ISIS has been estimated to possess in excess of $500 mil-
lion in assets through ransoms, looting, extortion, and the ca-
pacity to generate $500 million from oil revenue annually to 
fund its reign of terror.144 Because money is so critical to its 
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reign of terror, these anti-money laundering regulatory weap-
ons designed to cut off its funding are just as important in this 
battle as traditional weapons of bullets and bombs.  
Third, in terms of banking restrictions, nation-states uti-
lize designations and bans to prevent their adversaries from 
fully accessing the global banking system. Because of the inter-
connectedness of modern finance, and the central role of the 
United States in it, such restrictions can render a nation-state 
or organization isolated from the global financial system and 
unable to secure financing for its war efforts and rogue opera-
tions since legitimate institutions fear the reputational risks of 
being associated with rogue organizations.145 In a financial sys-
tem that revolves around the United States, American financial 
weaponry is far-reaching and can enlist foreign financial insti-
tutions for assistance.146 For example, as part of the war 
against terrorism, the United States designated certain chari-
ties and organizations as “terrorist organizations,” and denied 
them access to the global financial system since any institution 
conducting business with a designated organization would be 
prohibited from engaging in financial dealings with any Ameri-
can entity, corporation, or individual.147 Additionally, because 
the U.S. dollar serves as the reserve currency of the world, 
banking restrictions have the practical effect of making it ex-
tremely difficult for a restricted party to conduct any meaning-
ful transactions around the world.148 In 2014, the United States 
imposed a series of sanctions against firms and individuals 
close to Russian President Vladimir Putin that essentially froze 
those “individuals and institutions out of the vast swath of the 
global financial market denominated in dollars.”149 More recent-
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ly, American regulators fined Commerzbank, a German finan-
cial corporation, almost $1.5 billion for providing banking ser-
vices for certain designated Iranian businesses.150 In sum, given 
the importance of the United States in the global financial sys-
tem, banking restrictions and designations could choke off ac-
cess to any legitimate financial infrastructure for an adversary 
and render them an outcast to much of the international finan-
cial community.151  
While no weapon and no defense can perfectly prevent eve-
ry attack from an adversary, thoughtful targeted strikes using 
analog financial weapons can seriously blunt the efforts of our 
enemies.152 In recognition of the importance of the analog finan-
cial weapons of war, the United States has invested substantial 
resources in building up its capabilities. The Treasury Depart-
ment now has its own intelligence and counterterrorist unit 
consisting of over 700 individuals with an annual budget of 
$200 million to fight a diverse and expanding cast of adver-
saries using various analog weapons of war.153  
B. CYBER WEAPONS 
As with the emergence of analog financial weapons, cyber 
financial weapons have also emerged as critical armaments in 
modern warfare with the rise and proliferation of the Internet 
and information technology.154 America’s heavy financial and 
military reliance on high-tech informational networks render it 
particularly vulnerable to cyber weapons.155 The volume and 
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deployed instantaneously and surreptitiously thousands of miles away from its 
target.”); Barton Gellman, Cyber Attacks by al Qaeda Feared: Terrorists at 
Threshold of Using Internet As Tool of Bloodshed, Experts Say, WASH. POST, 
June 27, 2002, at A1; David E. Sanger, Document Reveals Growth of 
Cyberwarfare Between the U.S. and Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2015, at A5.  
 155. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 94, at 2 (“A disruptive, manipulative, or 
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varieties of cyberattacks on financial institutions, like all 
cyberattacks, increase annually.156 In modern financial warfare, 
the first shots of the battle are frequently fired in cyberspace. 
As an early example, in 2007, during a dispute with Russia, the 
Baltic nation-state of Estonia experienced a massive 
cyberattack on its entire cyber infrastructure, which partially 
paralyzed the country’s banking system and entire online in-
frastructure.157 Disclosures by Edward Snowden of classified 
documents indicated that the United States had initiated over 
200 offensive cyberattacks in 2011 against China, Iran, Russia, 
and North Korea, many with important military and economic 
implications.158 More recently, in 2014, around the time of the 
Ukrainian presidential elections, it has been reported that 
Russia unleashed a series of cyberattacks on the election com-
mission, military forces, and other governmental entities of 
Ukraine.159 
The truth of the matter is that cyber weapons of financial 
war and cyber weapons in general have become more varied, 
more sophisticated, and more prevalent in modern warfare. In 
2013, General Keith Alexander, the then head of U.S. Cyber 
Command, announced that the Pentagon would have thirteen 
offensive cyber teams by 2015.160 A 2015 Pentagon report found 
“significant vulnerabilities on nearly every” weapons program 
under its control.161 A 2015 Wall Street Journal study reported 
 
destructive cyberattack could present a significant risk to U.S. economic and 
national security if lives are lost, property destroyed, policy objectives harmed, 
or economic interests affected.”); Waxman, supra note 5, at 424 (“[E]lectronic 
and informational interconnectivity creates tremendous vulnerabilities, and 
some experts speculate that the United States may be especially at risk be-
cause of its high economic and military dependency on networked information 
technology.”). 
 156. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY 
PRACTICES 1 (2015). 
 157. See Mark Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, 
War Fears Turn to Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A1. 
 158. See Barton Gellman & Ellen Nakashima, “Black Budget” Details a 
War in Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2013, at A1; see also Michael Riley, 
How the U.S. Government Hacks the World, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 
27, 2013, at 35–37.  
 159. See Margaret Coker & Paul Sonne, Ukraine: Cyberwar’s Hottest Front, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-cyberwars 
-hottest-front-1447121671. 
 160. Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Creates Teams To Launch Cyberattacks 
as Threat Grows, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost 
.com/2013-03-12/world/37645469_1_new-teams-national-security-threat 
-attacks. 
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“29 countries now have formal military or intelligence units 
dedicated to offensive cyberefforts.”162 A recent survey of Ameri-
can financial institutions indicated that attacks from other na-
tion-states and hackers using cyber weapons are some of their 
most pressing concerns.163 In 2013 alone, it has been reported 
that “the average American company fielded a total of 16,856 
attacks” from cyber weapons.164 In response to the rise of cyber 
weapons, in 2015 President Obama issued an executive order 
that empowered the Treasury Secretary to block the financial 
assets of individuals that use cyber weapons to harm the na-
tional security and economic welfare of the United States.165 
Three broad, interrelated categories of such weapons are worth 
highlighting in connection with financial cyberwarfare: distrib-
uted denials-of-services attacks, data manipulation hacks, and 
destructive intrusions.  
First, distributed denials-of-services (DDoS) attacks are 
cyber incursions that attempt to disrupt and suspend the ser-
vice of an online host to its users, and are one of the most com-
mon forms of cyberattacks.166 DDoS attacks frequently operate 
by flooding a site with illegitimate traffic and requests until 
that site is overwhelmed and all services are suspended. In 
2008, Russia concurrently launched a cyberwar in addition to a 
traditional war against Georgia by deploying a series of DDoS 
attacks against key Georgian computer systems.167 In 2012, six 
major American banks were subjected to DDoS attacks by an 
organization called the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters 
that rendered their online services temporarily inaccessible to 
their customers and clients.168 A year later, major banks were 
again subjected to another round of persistent DDoS attacks, 
 
EVALUATION, FY 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 336 (2015) [hereinafter ODOTE]. 
 162. Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Danny Yadron, Cataloging the World’s 
Cyberforces, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/  
cataloging-the-worlds-cyberforces-1444610710. 
 163. Matthew Goldstein, Firms Wary of Breaches by Hackers, Not Terror-
ists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015, at B8. 
 164. Lev Grossman, The Code War, TIME MAG., July 21, 2014, at 20. 
 165. Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 2, 2015), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-blocking 
-property-certain-persons-engaging-significant-m. 
 166. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 837. 
 167. See ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCEL-
LENCE, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 66–90 
(2010). 
 168. See, e.g., Perlroth, supra note 97. 
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but this time from the nation-state of Iran.169 In 2015, it was 
reported that China possessed a cyber weapon that could inter-
cept and re-direct a tsunami of Internet traffic to sites that it 
wanted to shut down.170 To date, DDoS attacks on our financial 
institutions have all been temporary in their effects, but they 
could cause serious and lasting damage. For instance, a suc-
cessful DDoS attack on the New York Stock Exchange or the 
NASDAQ during a normal trading day could cause massive fi-
nancial chaos and possibly an economic crisis, to say nothing of 
the psychological and emotional toll on American and interna-
tional citizens.  
Second, data manipulation hacks, or semantic attacks, can 
serve as another powerful cyber weapon of financial warfare. 
Data manipulation hacks or semantic attacks describe cyber 
aggressions that are intended to plunder or maliciously alter 
data towards destructive ends.171 Enemies of a state can hack 
their way into the networks of financial institutions and steal 
or manipulate critical data that then could be used to cause 
economic chaos on a country and possibly the entire global fi-
nancial system. Industry-wide studies about cybersecurity con-
ducted in 2011 and 2014 indicated that financial firms were 
most concerned with data manipulation hacks.172 Events in re-
cent years give those firms good cause for concern. In 2014, it 
was reported that Iran initiated a series of coordinated 
cyberattacks in sixteen countries with the goal of stealing and 
manipulating data related to critical infrastructure and finan-
cial operations.173 That same year, hackers attacked J.P. Mor-
gan Chase and stole gigabytes of data that gave them access to 
numerous customer accounts and millions of dollars in funds.174 
While much of the damage arising from data manipulation at-
tacks has been limited, a far more damaging attack is foreseea-
ble. The late popular novelist, Tom Clancy, described a night-
 
 169. See, e.g., Perlroth & Hardy, supra note 97.  
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Apr. 11, 2015, at B1. 
 171. See MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CTR. FOR ADVANCED COMMAND CONCEPTS AND 
TECH., WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? 77 (1995) (describing a semantic at-
tack); Hollis, supra note 7, at 1042; Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations 
and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL. 63, 67 (2010) (discussing the 
effects of cyberattacks on data integrity and authenticity). 
 172. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 156, at 4.  
 173. Nicole Perlroth, Report Says Cyberattacks Originated Inside Iran, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at A14. 
 174. See Nicole Perlroth, 5 U.S. Banks Hit in Attack by Hackers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2014, at B1. 
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mare scenario in his novel Debt of Honor, in which enemies of 
the state maliciously injected falsified data into the American 
securities markets causing global financial chaos as automated 
programs instantaneously reacted to the bad information be-
fore it could be detected.175 
Third, in addition to DDoS attacks and data manipulation 
hacks, destructive intrusion attacks are cyber weapons that are 
used to destroy critical financial infrastructure.176 The antago-
nists would deploy such cyber weapons against a critical finan-
cial target with the goal of destroying the target rather than 
disrupting it. During the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, the 
United States considered launching a cyberattack to destroy 
the Iraqi financial system prior to commencing bombing but ul-
timately declined to do so for fear of creating financial chaos in 
the region.177 Similarly, a terrorist organization can attempt to 
destroy the New York Mercantile Exchange by using a comput-
er virus to attack the servers of the exchange in a manner that 
would lead to systemic failures and chaos in the commodities 
market. It has been alleged that, in 2011, the United States 
and Israel unleashed Stuxnet, a computer virus superworm, 
deemed by some at the time as “the most sophisticated cyber 
weapon ever deployed,” to destroy an Iranian nuclear weapons 
facility.178 Stuxnet destroyed the centrifuges in the nuclear fa-
cility by clandestinely reprogramming them to overwork until 
destruction.179 A year later, it was reported that another com-
puter super virus called the Flame—which some again at-
tributed to the United States and Israel—was “afflicting com-
puters in Iran and the Middle East.”180 More recently, in 2015, 
 
 175. See TOM CLANCY, DEBT OF HONOR 294–312 (1994). While this scenario 
may appear far-fetched, in the same novel Mr. Clancy also envisioned enemies 
of America intentionally crashing jets into strategically important buildings, 
which became a reality on September 11, 2001. See id. at 760–64. 
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Delivering Alpha Conference (July 16, 2014). 
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for a possible cyberattack to disrupt the financial structure of the Iraqi 
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 178. See William J. Broad et al., Israeli Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nucle-
ar Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1; see also KIM ZETTER, COUNT-
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TAL WEAPON 52–70 (2014). 
 179. Broad et al., supra note 178. 
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ing, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2012, at B1.  
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it was reported that the United States has embedded “surveil-
lance and sabotage tools” in targeted computer systems of its 
adversaries in Iran, Russia, Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, and 
other countries.181 In 2015, it was also reported that Russian 
hackers had breached Pentagon and White House computer 
systems, including some of President Obama’s emails.182 That 
same year, it was alleged that China hacked into the computer 
systems of the Office of Personnel Management and acquired 
the private information of over 21.5 million people with ties to 
the federal government, which amounted to “apparently the 
largest cyberattack into the systems of the United States gov-
ernment.”183 While a major destructive cyberattack has yet to 
occur in the homeland to our financial infrastructure or other 
critical infrastructure, our adversaries are likely planning such 
attacks.184 Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
warned a few years ago that the United States was facing a po-
tential “cyber–Pearl Harbor” in the near future.185 
Cyberattacks can be particularly challenging to defend 
against, although public and private actors have made signifi-
cant strides in improving cybersecurity in recent years.186 Rec-
ognizing the seriousness of cyber weapons against the financial 
system and other American interests,187 the federal government 
has responded to this emerging threat with more aggressive 
and strategic cyber-defense and cyber weapons programs in re-
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cybersecurity defense system); Gordon & Ford, supra note 91 (“Despite the 
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5, at 874–77 (opining on legal challenges to addressing cyberattacks); Roberts, 
supra note 91 (acknowledging difficulties in tracing the origins of 
cyberattacks); Gross, supra note 91, at 220 (“Because virtual attacks can be 
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 187. See Costigan, supra note 87, at 117 (noting the FBI estimated that cy-
bercrime costs the U.S. $400 billion annually). 
  
2016] FINANCIAL WEAPONS 1411 
 
cent years.188 In 2012 alone, the Air Force spent about $4 billion 
on its cyber programs,189 and the Labor Department, in re-
sponse to cyber threats, improved the computer security of its 
valuable economic data.190 In 2013, it was revealed that Presi-
dent Obama possessed broad powers relating to cyberstrikes 
against our enemies.191 That same year, President Obama also 
issued an executive order aimed at enhancing cybersecurity, 
and established the U.S. National Institute for Standards and 
Technology Cybersecurity Framework to encourage the public-
private information sharing on best cybersecurity practices.192 
In 2015, the White House announced a new executive order on 
cybersecurity and the creation of the Cyber Threat Intelligence 
Integration Center under the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence to better monitor and respond to cyberthreats; and 
the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 was signed into law as part of an 
omnibus spending bill.193 That same year, the Department of 
Defense also released a comprehensive white paper on its cyber 
strategy.194 In 2016, the White House announced a 
Cybersecurity National Action Plan intended to initiate near 
term and long term actions towards enhancing cybersecurity.195 
In addition to the panoply of government action, private firms 
have also made greater efforts to secure their information sys-
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tems and purchase insurance in connection with these at-
tacks.196 Despite all these efforts, as financial warfare grows 
and evolves, perfect cybersecurity is impossible in an intercon-
nected world, so industry and government sentinels must re-
main vigilant of the growing and evolving threats.197 
III.  OLD RULES AND NEW CONCERNS   
War poses problems for law. Cicero, the Roman philoso-
pher and politician, bleakly stated that, “In time of war, law is 
silent.”198 New concerns raised by the brutality and unpredicta-
bility of war, at times, render law unfit to address many of 
them. Emerging financial warfare is no different. The policy 
challenges posed by financial warfare are rooted deeply in core 
tensions between the conventional laws of war and the realities 
of the world. War and peace today look very different than in 
eras past. In fact, the differences between war time and peace 
time have become less distinct.199 As such, many of the old 
rules, old modes, and old ways of the past are not suitable for 
addressing some of the challenges of the present and the 
emerging future of conflict and war.200 Questions and issues 
about how longstanding laws and norms about war should gov-
ern financial hostilities, cyberattacks, and non-state actors are 
at the heart of these core tensions.  
A. OF FINANCIAL HOSTILITIES  
The laws and norms of war—the jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello principles—have long defined triggering events for war 
and wartime conduct primarily in the context of armed conflicts 
between and among nations.201 For instance, the North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization (NATO) in Article 5 of its founding Wash-
ington Treaty of 1949 states that “an armed attack against one 
[member state] or more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all.”202 Yet no clear 
laws or widely accepted norms govern attacks that are econom-
ic and financial in nature where traditional arms are not used, 
even though the damage can nonetheless be just as devastat-
ing.203  
Part of the tension that arises from attempting to apply 
traditional laws and rules of war from the context of warring 
nation-states to economic and financial hostilities is rooted in 
the view that such hostilities are better understood in the con-
text of commerce, crime, and diplomacy, not warfare.204 This 
perspective is supported by a longstanding understanding that 
economic coercion is generally not considered a prohibited use 
of force for purposes of international law.205 In fact, drafters of 
the United Nations Charter considered and rejected the view 
that economic coercion should be a prohibited use of force.206 
The United Nations, furthermore, has long used economic sanc-
tions as one of its governance tools.207 Additionally, states regu-
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larly and lawfully use economic coercion in dealing with their 
adversaries, thereby giving more credence to the view that eco-
nomically coercive policies are not prohibited uses of force.208 
While this perspective is correct in many instances, it is not 
correct in all instances. A severe, unprovoked tariff on Ameri-
can imports by a foreign state should not be considered an act 
of economic or financial hostility in the context of warfare. Al-
ternatively, a severe, unprovoked attempt to destroy the proper 
functions of the New York Stock Exchange with the intent of 
harming the American financial system by a foreign state 
should warrant closer consideration as an act of war. These two 
scenarios present easier cases. The more vexing cases arise 
when the lines demarcating the spheres of commerce, crime, 
diplomacy, and warfare blur and intersect.209  
Direct actions against American economic and financial in-
terests in recent years by our adversaries have further ob-
scured the distinctions among commerce, crime, diplomacy, and 
warfare. Additionally, these attacks frequently do not distin-
guish between civilians and non-civilians.210 When a financial 
institution is attacked, both civilians and non-civilians may be 
harmed. China has been suspected of concerted state-sponsored 
cyberattacks and espionage against private American financial 
institutions for many years.211 The Russians have hacked into 
the NASDAQ, and have made covert attempts to destabilize 
our capital markets.212 Iran has made sustained effort to desta-
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bilize our banking system through persistent cyberattacks.213 
Various non-state actors have also made serious attempts to 
cause significant damage to our civilian financial institutions.214  
As cool and cold wars grow warm and hot, these tensions 
between traditional laws of war and modern financial hostili-
ties will continue to persist.215 Therefore, American and inter-
national policymakers need to take a more proactive approach 
with the governance of financial weapons in modern conflicts 
by resolving the existing tensions of traditional laws of warfare 
and contemporary realities.216 If a complete resolution of these 
tensions is not possible in the near future, policymakers should, 
at minimum, articulate a set of clear guiding principles for the 
road ahead.  
B. OF CYBERATTACKS 
The traditional laws and norms of war and armed conflict 
are not well suited to address many of the new concerns relat-
ing to attacks based in cyberspace.217 There are no clear strate-
gies for cyberattacks despite the enormous potential financial 
fallout and physical destruction that can occur from 
cyberattacks.218 Numerous basic questions about cyberattacks 
in the financial realm and beyond continue to lack a wide and 
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grounds that it may threaten the stability of the international financial sys-
tem.”). 
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clear consensus among key international stakeholders.219 These 
basic questions are rooted partially in fundamental issues re-
lating to sovereignty, weaponry, and governance.  
First, in terms of sovereignty, cyberattacks raise pressing 
issues about jurisdiction.220 As a general matter of international 
law, a sovereign’s legal powers normally end at its borders, but 
warfare in cyberspace pays little regard to national bounda-
ries.221 Is cyberspace a new extra-sovereign domain given its in-
herent extra-territorial nature?222 Scholars and policymakers 
have wrestled with this question since the early days of the In-
ternet, and this question has serious implications for laws of 
war.223 The United States has defined cyberspace as “the inter-
 
 219. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 320 (discussing how states “disagree 
about almost everything” relating to cyber issues); Karl Rauscher, Writing the 
Rules of Cyberwar, IEEE SPECTRUM, Dec. 2013, at 30 (advocating for new in-
ternational conventions on cyberwarfare). 
 220. See Johnson & Post, supra note 7, at 1367 (“Global computer-based 
communications cut across territorial borders, creating a new realm of human 
activity and undermining the feasibility—and legitimacy—of laws based on 
geographic boundaries.”); Lessig, supra note 7, at 514–22 (describing various 
regulatory challenges posed by the amorphous boundaries of cyberspace); May, 
supra note 217, at 6. 
 221. See JOHN KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83 (David 
Turns ed., 1995) (“The general principle of exclusive sovereignty over national 
territory is firmly established in customary international law. Each State ex-
ercises control over its national territory to the exclusion of all other States, 
and any limitation of this authority is subject to the consent of the territorial 
State.”); ROBERT K. KNAKE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF CYBER SECURITY 16 (2010) (“Whereas national le-
gal authority is bounded by borders, the Internet is not.”); Kristen E. 
Eichensehr, Cyberwar & International Law Zero Step, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 355, 
368 (2015) (“[I]nternational law has traditionally operated at the level of sov-
ereign States . . . .”). 
 222. See Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 1200–01; Eugene Kontorovich, The 
Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 190–92 (2004). 
 223. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTER-
NET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 476 (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 391 (2006) (“There has 
been a rich, and sometimes unnecessary, debate about whether indeed cyber-
space is a ‘place.’”); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Signifi-
cance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 476 (1998) 
(“The Internet is not, as many suggest, a separate place removed from our 
world. Like the telephone, the telegraph, and the smoke signal, the Internet is 
a medium through which people in real space in one jurisdiction communicate 
with people in real space in another jurisdiction.”); David G. Post, Against 
“Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1366 (2002) (“Com-
munication in cyberspace is not ‘functionally identical’ to communication in 
real space . . . . Furthermore, the jurisdictional and choice-of-law dilemmas 
posed by cyberspace activity cannot be adequately resolved by applying the 
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dependent network of information technology infrastructures, 
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer 
systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical 
industries.”224 The United States and a few other countries in-
cluding China, Iran, Israel, and the United Kingdom have re-
ferred to cyberspace as a domain for military purposes.225 None-
theless, unlike traditional warfare, there remains no clear 
consensus on this important question relating to sovereignty 
and jurisdiction.226 Traditional wars and armed conflicts take 
place with more understood weapons and within less disputed 
jurisdictions, be it air, land, sea, or space defined by laws and 
norms rooted in geographic boundaries.227 The same cannot be 
said about cyberspace and cyber weapons. While the individu-
als and the hardware that power cyber weapons may be based 
fully within one sovereign, their actions occur in virtual space 
and can have real world effects across multiple sovereigns. As 
such, laws and norms that were designed to govern conflicts 
among and between nations taking place in clear geographic 
domains at times are ill-suited and impotent when applied to 
cyberattacks.228  
Second, in terms of weaponry, cyberattacks create tensions 
because their armaments of computers and computer code are 
frequently not designed to harm adversaries in the same man-
ner as traditional weapons of war like foot soldiers, bombs, and 
bullets.229 What constitutes an act of war, an illegal use of force, 
an armed conflict, or a lesser offense if the aggression is cyber 
in nature?230 What and how should the law consider a 
 
‘settled principles’ and ‘traditional legal tools’ developed for analogous prob-
lems in realspace.”). 
 224. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW 1 (2009). 
 225. See DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2013 37 (2013); Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 329–30. 
 226. Waxman, supra note 5, at 444. 
 227. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 827 (“Warfare traditionally func-
tions in four domains—land, air, sea, and space—each of which is addressed 
by one of the full-time armed services.”). 
 228. See Duncan B. Hollis, Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Law in Cyber-
space: A Duty To Hack?, in CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 131; Eric Talbot Jen-
sen, Future War and the War Powers Resolution, 29 EMORY INT’L L.J. 499, 
537–39 (2015); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked 
World Order, 40 STAN J. INT’L L. 283, 284–87 (2004); Sanger, supra note 218. 
 229. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 845 (discussing competing legal 
views on cyberattacks); Hollis, supra note 7, at 140 (highlighting difficulties of 
applying traditional legal doctrines to cyber attacks). 
 230. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Princi-
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cyberattack analogous to an attack in traditional warfare?231 
These questions are already complex for traditional operations, 
but become even more vexing for cyber operations relating to 
financial institutions and financial infrastructure.232 In the con-
text of financial warfare, the intent of cyberattacks is often 
rooted in destabilizing and harming an adversary’s economy ra-
ther than producing human casualties. The damage is fre-
quently financial and psychological in nature, but nonetheless 
devastating.233 For instance, in 2008, a malicious espionage 
software program called GhostNet was discovered in the com-
puter system of the Dalai Lama, and later in computer systems 
located in over one hundred countries, including the systems of 
foreign ministries and embassies.234 GhostNet gave an outside 
party complete control and occupation of another party’s com-
puter system without detection.235 Had GhostNet been an elite 
covert group of Chinese soldiers physically occupying and 
commandeering the information system of another country’s 
embassy or finance ministry towards destructive ends, the 
 
ple of Non-Intervention, in CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 249–51; David E. Gra-
ham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 87, 90–100 
(2010); Hollis, supra note 7, at 1027–28 (describing nebulous classifications for 
aggressions in cyberspace); Jensen, supra note 94, at 208–10 (questioning 
whether an attack on a nation’s computer network constitutes an illegal use of 
force under traditional international law).  
 231. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 5, at 180–82; Hathaway et al., supra note 
5, at 843–46 (outlining competing perspectives on the inquiry of what consti-
tutes a cyberattack); Hollis, supra note 228, at 180–82 (advocating for requir-
ing “states to use cyber operations in their military operations whenever they 
are the least harmful means available for achieving military objectives”); Mat-
thew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A 
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their 
Duty To Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 74–75 (2009); Sean Watts, Combatant 
Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 391, 425 (2010) (as-
serting that traditional laws of war that govern uses of force should govern 
cyber weapons as well).  
 232. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 n.53 (D.D.C. 1987); 
Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before S. Foreign Relations Comm., 112th 
Cong. 22 (2011) (prepared statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. 
Dep’t of State); Allison Arnold, Cyber “Hostilities” and the War Powers Resolu-
tion, 217 MIL. L. REV. 174, 180–82 (2013). 
 233. Sanger, supra note 218. 
 234. See INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, TRACKING GHOSTNET: INVESTIGATING 
A CYBER ESPIONAGE NETWORK 5–22 (2009). 
 235. See id. at 5–6; Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1014 (describing GhostNet 
as “a sophisticated software program capable of covertly capturing keystrokes, 
copying files, and even activating cameras and microphones attached to in-
fected computers”).  
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rules of engagement would be relatively clear.236 However, be-
cause GhostNet is a software program likely attributable to 
China, the rules of engagement are not as clear.237 Attempting 
to map rules and norms designed for weapons and attacks that 
kill humans and physically destroy structures to weapons and 
attacks that disrupt and decimate computer systems can be in-
credibly difficult.238 Part of the challenge is rooted in the fact 
that cyberattacks can come in so many forms with a wide-range 
of consequences that encompasses the temporary denial of ser-
vice to a website to the destruction of a nuclear weapons facili-
ty.239 As a result of these challenges, to date, there are no wide-
ly accepted treaties or norms governing the use of cyber 
weapons.240 
Third, in terms of governance, cyberattacks have created 
breaks among nation-states and other stakeholders about how 
best to govern cyberspace. Traditional warfare and armed con-
flict is largely governed by over a century of established and 
widely agreed upon rules and norms (albeit with some disa-
greements).241 As previously noted, the same cannot be said 
about the emerging war theater of cyberspace, where key 
stakeholders possess competing visions of the best governance 
models. The United States generally prefers a multiple stake-
holder model of cyber governance where states, international 
organizations, and private actors all play a shared role in gov-
ernance.242 The Obama administration has publicly declared the 
United States’ commitment to “[p]romote and enhance multi-
stakeholder venues for the discussion of Internet governance 
 
 236. Jensen, supra note 94, at 222. 
 237. See INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, supra note 234, at 48; Jensen, supra 
note 94, at 235–36 (contrasting the rules of engagement for traditional attacks 
and cyberattacks). 
 238. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 826; Hollis, supra note 7, at 1045 
(opining on the challenges of translating existing rules of conflict into the con-
text of cyberattacks); William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pen-
tagon’s Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 108 (“The cyberthreat does not in-
volve the existential implications ushered in by the nuclear age . . . .”); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyber-
space (Sept. 18, 2012), in 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2012. 
 239. See Jensen, supra note 94, at 222; Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 
836 (asserting that “[c]yber-warfare can also constitute both cyber-attack and 
cyber-crime”).  
 240. See Hollis, supra note 7, at 135–40; Sanger, supra note 218. 
 241. See KENNEDY, supra note 199, at 46–63 (chronicling the historical evo-
lution of law and war). 
 242. Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 321. 
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issues.”243 China and Russia, alternatively, generally prefer a 
sovereignty-oriented model of cyber governance that gives indi-
vidual states most of the power.244 In fact, in early 2015, pursu-
ant to its vision of cyberspace governance, China issued a series 
of regulations that gave it even greater control over the Inter-
net as used in China, including requiring companies, particu-
larly those working with Chinese banks, to give government 
regulators “backdoor” access to all computerized systems in the 
country; those regulations were temporarily suspended later in 
2015 after much protest from American banks and other corpo-
rations.245 Because of these dueling visions of cyberspace gov-
ernance, there exists no meaningful international consensus or 
accord on the governance of cyberspace and cyberattacks 
among key stakeholders, despite their growing prevalence and 
growing importance.246 For instance, there is no clear, widely 
accepted agreement on the obligations of states regarding their 
due diligence duties to prevent cyberattacks on other states 
that originate within their sovereign territory.247 
It is important to note that this discussion about the diffi-
culties of mapping traditional modes of law to cyberattacks 
does not suggest that cyberspace is completely lawless, ungov-
ernable, or without shared values among key stakeholders.248 It 
is understood that significant efforts have been made to expand 
traditional legal doctrines to the realms of cyberattacks in re-
cent years, and that international stakeholders can reach 
agreements in critical areas concerning cyberattacks while 
maintaining strong disagreements in other areas.249 Interna-
tionally, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excel-
 
 243. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 188, at 22. 
 244. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 320. 
 245. See Andrew Jacobs, China Further Tightens Grip on the Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2015, at A1; Paul Mozur & Jane Perlez, China Halts New Pol-
icy on Tech for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2015, at B1. 
 246. See Sanger, supra note 218. 
 247. See Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 
125 YALE L.J. F. 68, 69–70 (2015). 
 248. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 859–77 (providing an overview of 
a patchwork of international law relating to cyberattacks). 
 249. See William H. Boothby, Methods and Means of Cyber Warfare, 89 
INT’L L. STUD. 387 (2013); Eichensehr, supra note 7; Jack Goldsmith, How 
Cyber Changes the Laws of War, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 129 (2013); Eric Talbot 
Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions in Attack, 89 INT’L L. 
STUD. 198 (2013); Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 89 
INT’L L. STUD. 233 (2013); see also GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREE-
MENTS: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED RIVALRIES 4 (2007) (discussing a theory 
that highlights coexistence of conflict and cooperation among rival states). 
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lence initiated a multi-year, multi-country study on law and 
cyberwarfare, which culminated in the Tallin Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare as an important 
compilation of guiding principles.250 In 2013, the United States 
and other countries party to the Wassenaar Arrangement, an 
agreement governing international arms sales, included intru-
sion software as a restricted dual-use technology.251 That same 
year, the United Nations also issued a report of recommenda-
tions on information and telecommunications security.252 Do-
mestically, when Congress passed the 2012 National Defense 
Authorization Act, it stated that offensive military cyber opera-
tions would be subject to the War Powers Resolution.253 More 
broadly, the United States has taken the general position that 
emerging issues relating to cyberspace do “not require a rein-
vention of customary international law, nor [do they] render ex-
isting international norms obsolete.”254 Additionally, the United 
States has also taken the position that, to the extent that hos-
tile cyber actions cause the same damage as traditional warfare 
actions, similar laws and norms concerning self-defense will 
govern.255 And in 2015, the United States and China reached a 
preliminary agreement concerning broad principles relating to 
cybersecurity.256 Nevertheless, despite recent preliminary ef-
 
  250. NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLIN MANUAL ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. 
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MENT, http://www.wassenaar.org (last updated Jan. 20, 2016). 
 252. See U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/156 (July 16, 2013); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, U.N. Doc. A/70/172 (July 22, 2015). 
 253. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-81, § 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011). But see Jensen, supra note 228, 
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forts and working understandings, cyberattacks nonetheless 
pose serious challenges for traditional laws and norms of war, 
as many critical issues relating to sovereignty, weaponry, and 
governance remain unresolved.257  
C. OF NON-STATE ADVERSARIES 
Traditional laws and norms of war and armed conflict are 
robust and rich in addressing the actions of state adversaries, 
but they are not as well equipped to address the actions of non-
state adversaries.258 While non-state adversaries like terrorist 
organizations have existed for centuries, much of the legal in-
frastructure remains better suited to address state adver-
saries.259 As non-state adversaries continue to play more promi-
nent roles in modern warfare, tensions arise when old doctrines 
mismatch new realities.260 Non-state adversaries present spe-
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cial challenges for the law because of the lack of meaningful 
comity, reciprocity, and accountability.  
In terms of comity and reciprocity, nation-states can readi-
ly enter into legal agreements that govern their wartime behav-
ior and reasonably expect one another to cooperatively abide by 
them.261 For instance, the Hague Conventions of 1899 banned 
the use of certain poisonous arms in warfare among nations.262 
More recently, the United States, Japan, and a number of Eu-
ropean nations have ratified the Council of Europe’s Conven-
tion on Cybercrime (a.k.a. The Budapest Convention) to govern 
actions related to the emerging field of cybercrime.263 However, 
unlike state actors, it is much more difficult to enter into legal 
agreements about wartime behavior with non-state adver-
saries.264 Additionally, given their lawless and barbaric behav-
ior, it is hard to imagine hackers or terrorist groups like al 
Qaeda and ISIS ever reaching a formal accord or treaty with a 
state-based adversary like the United States.265 This discussion 
on the lack of comity and reciprocity does not mean to suggest 
that in dealing with non-state adversaries state actors should 
ignore all the laws and norms of war and armed conflict. Ulti-
mately, as President Obama stated in his 2009 Nobel Lecture, 
 
plications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1051, 1073–74 
(1998) (“If twenty-first century national security threats are to come from non-
state actors, then the law governing the resort to force is bound to evolve in a 
way that permits an effective defense against them . . . .”). 
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RELATIONS, LAW, AND DEVELOPMENT 136 (2014) (explaining how states gen-
erally interact on a rational basis with other states); Daphné Richemond-
Barak, Applicability and Application of the Laws of War to Modern Conflicts, 
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“adhering to standards, international standards, strengthens 
those who do, and isolates and weakens those who don’t.”266 
In addition to comity and reciprocity, unlike state adver-
saries, it is much more difficult to hold non-state adversaries 
accountable to wartime laws and norms.267 With state-based 
adversaries, traditional tools of international law and diploma-
cy can be used to hold them accountable for breaches of war-
time laws and norms (albeit not always with success).268 Non-
state adversaries like hackers, terrorists, and lone-wolf com-
batants are frequently much more difficult to trace and find, let 
alone hold accountable.269 If a uniformed battalion of Russian 
soldiers infiltrated and destroyed the servers of the New York 
Stock Exchange, the American and international response 
would likely use traditional tools of international law and di-
plomacy to hold Russia accountable for the battalion’s ac-
tions.270 However, if a nameless lone-wolf terrorist, claiming af-
filiation with no state and only an online movement, decides to 
infiltrate and destroy the servers of the New York Stock Ex-
change, the American and international response to hold that 
lone-wolf terrorist accountable would have to be more creative 
and break from traditional laws and norms of war given the dif-
ficulties of identifying proper avenues for retaliation.271 In the 
absence of clear international law and military mechanisms, 
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domestic criminal enforcement tools may be more feasible as a 
near term tool for such serious transgressions. 
Moreover, the issue of accountability is predicated on the 
notion that wrongdoers can be properly identified for their mis-
deeds. International law generally requires the attribution of 
an attack to a state actor before sanctioning a responsive pro-
portionate use of force.272 Further complicating matters is that 
many non-state adversaries can reside in locales governed by 
state adversaries or neutral states thereby making assistance 
in identifying non-state adversaries that much more difficult.273 
For many actions by non-state adversaries, like those that use 
financial cyber weapons, attribution can be particularly diffi-
cult or nearly impossible with a high degree of certainty.274 As 
such, if attribution is uncertain, enforcement is frequently 
unachievable at a just and satisfactory level.275  
 
*  *  * 
The world changes swiftly, and the law changes slowly.276 
This Aesopian turtle and hare dynamic leads to tensions when 
old rules meet new concerns in modern warfare.277 Innovations 
at the intersection of modern war and finance exhibit this tense 
dynamic.278 The Geneva Conventions, the body of treaties gov-
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tional law requires states to attribute an attack to a state or its agents before 
responding with force . . . .”). 
 273. See id.; George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1174–95 (2000) (discussing the issue of neutral 
states in cyberwarfare).  
 274. See Jens David Ohlin, Cyber Causation, in CYBERWAR, supra note 7, 
at 37–44; Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Proxy Wars in Cyber Space: The 
Evolving International Law of Attribution, 1 FLETCHER SEC. REV., no. 2, at 55 
(2014); Jack Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, NEW REPUBLIC, June 24, 
2010, at 21, 23. 
 275. See COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND 
USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 252–53 (2009); Marco Roscini, Eviden-
tiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsibility for Cyber 
Operations, in CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 215–17.  
 276. See Eichensehr, supra note 221, at 358 (“New technologies pose chal-
lenges for law and for international law in particular. For as cumbersome and 
slow as domestic law appears in many circumstances, developing international 
law is often even more difficult.”). 
 277. See INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. ALL., supra note 94, at 6 (“National 
and international laws, regulations, and enforcement are still struggling to 
catch up to cyber activities worldwide.”); Koh, supra note 5, at 1772 (remark-
ing on the legal challenges posed by emerging technologies). 
 278. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, Interna-
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erning wartime conduct, remain largely unchanged since the 
years following World War II, despite revolutionary changes in 
the world of weaponry and warfare.279 The disparate timelines 
of law and war create significant tensions and unanswered 
questions. In terms of financial warfare, answers to critical 
questions concerning financial hostilities, cyberattacks, and 
non-state adversaries remain works-in-progress and render 
traditional rules of law impotent to fully address the dangers of 
modern warfare and national security.280 
IV.  KEY RECOMMENDATIONS   
The new financial theater of war and its weapons demand 
new laws and policies so as to better protect American interests 
and the American homeland. In order to remain relevant, laws 
and policies governing war must be updated in the same way 
that law has historically responded to other critical social, 
technological, and economic changes in the past.281 While many 
larger legal and political questions concerning financial warfare 
 
tional Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1855, 1856–57 (1997) (discussing how globalization has increased the burden 
of capital market regulators to maintain adequate disclosure, antifraud, and 
anti-manipulation rules); Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and 
Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 99, 114–15 (2002) (“The novelty of a weapon—
any weapon—always baffles statesmen and lawyers, many of whom are per-
plexed by technological innovations. . . . [A]fter a period of gestation, it usually 
dawns on belligerent parties that there is no insuperable difficulty in applying 
the general principles and rules of international law to the novel weapon 
. . . .”); Whitehead, supra note 6, at 2–5 (noting the lack of regulatory innova-
tion in response to financial innovation); Julia L. Chen, Note, Restoring Con-
stitutional Balance: Accommodating the Evolution of War, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
1767, 1788–92 (2012) (discussing how the new methodologies of warfare chal-
lenge traditional understandings of war powers). 
 279. Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 840. 
 280. See, e.g., Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 380 (“The intersovereign issues 
posed by cyber are more complicated and will probably take even longer to 
solve.”). 
 281. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at 356 (“The financial battlespace is con-
stantly evolving . . . . Our enemies are smart and will continue to adapt, tak-
ing advantage of the growing complexity and sophistication of international 
financial systems. We, too, must adapt . . . .”); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the 
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474–75 (1897) (articulating the necessity of law to 
adapt itself to novel technology); Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First 
Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. 725, 745–46 (2013) (espous-
ing changes and breaks in international lawmaking from past customs and 
practices); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (“Political, social, and economic changes entail 
the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows 
to meet the demands of society.”). 
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highlighted in the previous Part remain unresolved, a nation’s 
right to reasonably protect its financial infrastructure and fi-
nancial interests from legitimate threats should not be ques-
tioned.282 While broader, international, and multilateral con-
sensus remains forthcoming, domestic actions can be taken 
with greater urgency to better focus public and private re-
sources on financial warfare in a coordinated manner.283 To bet-
ter enhance financial defenses and capabilities, policymakers 
should introduce innovative cybersecurity incentives, advanced 
technological stress tests, and comprehensive financial war 
games to intelligently marshal public and private actors 
against the emerging threats posed by the financial weapons of 
war.  
A. CYBERSECURITY INCENTIVES 
Since much of modern finance operates predominantly in a 
privately held cyberspace infrastructure, policymakers should 
design incentives that encourage private businesses to expedi-
tiously enhance their cybersecurity capabilities in response to 
the emerging threats of financial weapons of war.284 Because 
much of the critical financial infrastructure is owned and oper-
ated by private businesses,285 and because such businesses are 
frequently motivated by profits, carefully calibrated incentives 
may be necessary to spur timely cybersecurity improvements 
 
 282. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51; DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE GEN. 
COUNSEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
15–18 (1999); Jensen, supra note 94, at 230 (“International law is clear in re-
gard to passive measures: every nation has the right to protect its computer 
systems by such means, just as it would its own airspace or territory.”). 
 283. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 15–23 
(2004) (arguing how emerging international issues can be better addressed 
through “government networks” constituted by legislators, regulators, and 
private stakeholders); Koh, supra note 281, at 743 (discussing the growing 
utility of “hybrid private-public arrangements” to address issues with interna-
tional implications). 
 284. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 7, at xxii (“Defending computer networks, 
and launching attacks on them, requires the participation, willing or other-
wise, of the private sector.”); Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or 
Cyberwar?: International Law, Domestic Law, and Self-Protective Measures, in 
CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 192–93 (highlighting the need for “improved soft-
ware engineering”); Sales, supra note 7, at 1550–52 (discussing the use of car-
rots and sticks to improve cybersecurity); Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, 
and Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 171, 173 (2005). 
 285. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 350 (“[P]rivate parties own the major-
ity of the underlying infrastructure that supports the cyber domain.”). 
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and investments. In the absence of incentives, investments in 
cybersecurity may remain stagnant as businesses focus on their 
bottom line rather than their information security and institu-
tional stability.286  
A pure market-based approach towards cybersecurity may 
be inadequate for building better defenses against dynamic 
threats.287 In the past couple of years alone, over half a billion 
people had their identities stolen online, President Obama’s 
credit card was breached, and the White House, the State De-
partment, Target, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Home Depot all suf-
fered serious cybersecurity breaches.288 Despite serious and 
persistent threats, it has been estimated that financial firms 
only invested approximately seven percent of their information 
technology budgets on security in recent years, though invest-
ments are growing in response to increased threats.289 J.P. 
Morgan Chase, for instance, invested “more than $250 million, 
and had approximately 1,000 people focused on cybersecurity 
efforts” in 2014 alone, expecting significantly increased invest-
ments in the near future.290 While some companies have made 
significant proactive cybersecurity investments, many have not. 
And to the extent incremental improvements are made, they 
are often done in a reactionary manner following some major 
security breach, so policy incentives may be necessary to en-
courage more proactive and timely behavior among more pri-
vate firms.291  
 
 286. See STEWART BAKER ET AL., MCAFEE, IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL IN-
FRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 14 (2009); NY DEP’T OF FIN. SERV., 
REPORT ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR 11 (May 2014) (high-
lighting resource constraints and stale software as ongoing challenges for fi-
nancial cybersecurity); Nicole Perlroth, Hacked vs. Hackers: Game On, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at F1 (reporting on the lack of urgency regarding 
cybersecurity). 
 287. JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: INSIDE THE NEW THREAT 
MATRIX OF DIGITAL ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 239 (2011). 
 288. See Perlroth, supra note 286. 
 289. See Sales, supra note 7, at 1538–39; Daniel Huang et al., Financial 
Firms Boost Cybersecurity Funds, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 17, 2014, at C3.  
 290. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 142 (Feb. 
24, 2015); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 66 (Aug. 
3, 2015) (“In each of 2015 and 2016, the Firm expects its annual cybersecurity 
spending to be nearly double what it was in 2014 in order to enhance its de-
fense capabilities.”). 
 291. Huang et al., supra note 289; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Matthew 
Goldstein, After Breach, Push To Close Security Gaps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2014, at B1; see, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 791, 848–50 (2015) (discussing various political tools for encour-
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Tax law, if properly calibrated, can serve as one such in-
centive-oriented policy to encourage private financial industry 
actors to enhance their cyber defenses in a timely manner. 
Through a combination of tax credits, bonus depreciation, and 
increased deductions, policymakers can encourage the replace-
ment of outdated, vulnerable information systems and greater 
investment in better, more secured systems.292 Following the 
recent financial crisis, pursuant to the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, policymakers used tax policy to incentivize 
private businesses to accelerate and enlarge capital invest-
ments to help stimulate the economy.293 Similarly, such incen-
tive-driven policies can be utilized to motivate private financial 
industry participants to act more expediently towards enhanc-
ing cybersecurity as a part of enhancing American financial se-
curity. 
Beyond tax policy, the federal government can also create 
better incentives through its vast procurement powers.294 The 
federal government can become a more active and public buyer 
or sponsor in the growing market for cyber weapons, cyber de-
fenses, and so-called zero-day exploits, which are vulnerabili-
ties unknown to a program’s administrator.295 If direct, open 
 
aging better cybersecurity). 
 292. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BONUS DEPRECIA-
TION: ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY ISSUES 4 (2014); GARY GUENTHER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., SECTION 179 AND BONUS DEPRECIATION EXPENSING AL-
LOWANCES: CURRENT LAW, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS, 
AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 1 (2014); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., HOW TO DEPRE-
CIATE PROPERTY 3–24 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p946.pdf; ERIC 
ZWICK & JAMES MAHON, DO FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AMPLIFY FISCAL POLICY? 
EVIDENCE FROM BUSINESS INVESTMENT STIMULUS 39 (Jan. 7, 2014), http:// 
scholar.harvard.edu/files/zwick/files; James M. Williamson & John L. Pender, 
Economic Stimulus and the Tax Code: The Impact of the Gulf Opportunity 
Zone, 1 Pub. Fin. Rev. 3 (2014), http://pfr.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/12/ 
11/1091142114557724.full.pdf. 
 293. Business Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/Business-Provisions 
-of-the-American-Recovery-and-Reinvestment-Act-of-2009-(ARRA) (last up-
dated Mar. 19, 2014). 
 294. See, e.g., Daniel P. Gitterman, The American Presidency and the Pow-
er of the Purchaser, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 225, 225–29 (2013) (describing 
the use of procurement to shape public policy). 
 295. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 
EMORY L.J. 1051, 1067–68 (2011) (discussing the growing market for cyber 
weapons and cyber defenses); Grossman, supra note 164, at 20–21 (reporting 
on the market for computer bugs, viruses, and vulnerabilities); Serena Saitto, 
The Big Business of Smashing Bugs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 16, 
2015, at 41 (highlighting the rise of the “bug bounty” marketplace). 
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federal government participation is too controversial, the fed-
eral government can also offer certain benefits or subsidies to 
those who sell exclusively to the American government or legit-
imate, white-hat American corporations.296 Private firms like 
Google and Microsoft already participate in this cyber arms 
marketplace.297 It has been documented that Google is willing 
to pay sums up to $60,000 for vulnerabilities in its Chrome 
browser; and Microsoft is willing to pay up to $100,000 for vul-
nerabilities in its software programs.298 The participation of the 
federal government, directly or indirectly, through mechanisms 
like prizes and bounties in this marketplace could help assure 
that these cyber arms are not unleashed on American financial 
interests.  
In addition to participating in the market for cyber weap-
ons through its procurement powers, the federal government 
can also encourage timely cybersecurity improvements by pri-
vate financial firms by expressing a contracting preference for 
firms that meet certain government cybersecurity benchmarks, 
if those benchmarks are regularly updated to be responsive to 
the current threats in cyberspace.299 Because the federal gov-
ernment is one of the largest purchasers of goods and services 
in the world, such contracting preferences could lead to signifi-
cant system-wide improvements in cybersecurity.300 The federal 
government already has cybersecurity requirements for many 
of its vendors, but it can do more to make sure that its 
cybersecurity requirements reflect the latest cyberthreats.301 In 
fact, in 2015, the Office of Management and Budget initiated a 
review of current acquisition practices with an eye towards en-
hancing cybersecurity through the federal procurement pro-
cess.302  
 
 296. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1087–88 (advocating for a gov-
ernment “bug bounty” program to purchase computer viruses and other mali-
cious software). 
 297. See ZETTER, supra note 178, at 100. 
 298. Id. at 102. 
 299. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1062–63 (suggesting implemen-
tation of IT requirements as a condition of contracting with the government); 
see also BAKER ET AL., supra note 286 (discussing underinvestment by private 
firms in cybersecurity). 
 300. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1062–63; Gitterman, supra note 294 
(examining the power of the president to shape policy using procurement). 
 301. See Security Requirements for Unclassified Information Resources, 48 
C.F.R. § 552.239-71 (2015). 
 302. Improving Cybersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions Public 
Comment Space, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, https://policy.cio.gov (last visit-
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While the threats of cyberattacks are well known in the fi-
nancial industry, the common business instincts to increase 
earnings and decrease expenditures may prevent businesses 
from behaving in the proactive and timely manner that is most 
beneficial to them and to the entire financial system.303 It may 
be necessary for the government to initiate and coordinate 
some of the desired outcomes.304 Proper public policy incentives 
could mitigate some of the collective action problems associated 
with cybersecurity.305 Moreover, because private enterprises 
play such critically important roles in modern finance, en-
hancements of our national cybersecurity without complemen-
tary private enhancements would be incomplete, and would 
leave the homeland very vulnerable to various financial weap-
ons of war.306 As such, incentive-oriented policies may be neces-
sary to improve the overall security of the financial system.  
B. TECHNOLOGICAL STRESS TESTS 
Policymakers should design advanced technological stress 
tests to assess the information technology infrastructure of sys-
temically important private and public financial institutions 
and agencies.307 These tech stress tests should be constructed 
and implemented to analyze the capabilities and vulnerabilities 
of the information technology systems of these entities similar 
to how banking regulators imposed capital stress tests to large 
financial institutions following the financial crisis. They can be 
administered through a federal agency apparatus like the De-
partment of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity and 
 
ed Mar. 7, 2016).  
 303. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1036 (“Rational vendors will ac-
cordingly skimp on security investments, at least at the margins, since they 
will likely not be able to recover those costs via higher prices that correlate 
with higher quality.”). 
 304. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 
662–64 (2011) (discussing the need for government regulation to encourage 
private companies to cooperate with one another to decrease cyber security 
risk). 
 305. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1031 (“[C]ybersecurity suffers from a 
collective-action problem.”). 
 306. See Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Strategic Command and 
U.S. Cyber Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fis-
cal Year 2014 and the Future Years Defense Program Before the S. Comm. on 
Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 32 (2013) (statement of Sen. Richard Blumenthal). 
 307. See, e.g., James A. “Sandy” Winnefeld, Jr. et al., Cybersecurity’s Hu-
man Factor: Lessons from the Pentagon, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2015, at 86, 94 
(discussing use of operational tests to enhance cybersecurity). 
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Communications Integration Center.308 These tests can help 
address some of the informational challenges associated with 
cybersecurity.309 They can provide policymakers and key indus-
try stakeholders with a more holistic, mosaic view of the 
cyberthreats being experienced by the financial system rather 
than just seeing glimpses of the threats based on firm-by-firm 
disclosures.310 The proposed technological stress tests can also 
create more opportunities for firms to share information and 
learn from one another. The fact of the matter is that in an age 
of persistent cyberattacks, no technological defense is failsafe 
and no weapon can serve as a complete deterrence.311 As such, 
private and public financial stakeholders must periodically 
learn about their own vulnerabilities as well as system-wide 
vulnerabilities so as to build better defenses. 
The recommendation of advanced technological stress tests 
is neither radical nor wholly unprecedented. The Pentagon and 
many financial institutions already voluntarily, or as part of le-
gal requirements, conduct some periodic testing with regards to 
their cybersecurity.312 Plus, the law also already requires many 
financial institutions to meet certain minimum informational 
safeguards. Pursuant to the 1998 Presidential Decision Di-
rective 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Coordi-
nators, the financial industry established the Financial Sector-
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to help aggregate 
and share information about cybersecurity threats.313 The Fi-
 
 308. See generally National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center, HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/national-cybersecurity 
-communications-integration-center (last updated Jan. 19, 2016) (describing 
the role of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cen-
ter). 
 309. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1035 (explaining how information 
asymmetries are obstacles for better cybersecurity). 
 310. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 156, at 34–36.  
 311. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 367 (opining that no state has a fail-
safe technological infrastructure); Lynn, supra note 238, at 97; Nye, supra 
note 269. 
 312. See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 314.3–4 (2015); Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, 4 NAT’L EXAM 
PROGRAM RISK ALERT 2 (2015) (“The vast majority of examined firms conduct 
periodic risk assessments, on a firm-wide basis, to identify cybersecurity 
threats, vulnerabilities, and potential business consequences.”). 
  313. Presidential Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion: Sector Coordinators, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,804, 41,804–06 (Aug. 5, 1998); About 
FS-ISAC, FIN. SERVS. INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CTR., https://www.fsisac 
.com/about (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).  
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nancial Services Modernization Act of 1999 mandates that reg-
ulated institutions meet certain benchmarks for protecting the 
financial information of their customers.314 Similarly, the Pen-
tagon also runs annual tests on all of its major weapon sys-
tems, including assessments for cybersecurity.315 More recently, 
in 2014, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority also rec-
ommended third-party penetration testing for financial firms 
as a way to assess their cybersecurity feasibility and vulnera-
bility.316 And in 2015, collectives of private firms created plat-
forms like Soltra and ThreatExchange to share information 
about cyberthreats.317  
In recognition of the persistent and growing threats of 
cyber weapons to our critical infrastructure, policymakers have 
recently taken more steps to enhance our cybersecurity capabil-
ities. In 2013, Congress introduced the Cyber Intelligence Shar-
ing and Protection Act to enhance the cyber infrastructure of 
the country, particularly the parts that are controlled by pri-
vate firms who are less likely to work together.318 Because that 
bill did not become law, President Obama signed an executive 
order focused on improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s 
critical infrastructure.319 As previously noted, the executive or-
der, among other matters, established the U.S. National Insti-
tute for Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework 
to encourage more collaboration and information sharing 
among public and private stakeholders on best practices in 
cybersecurity.320 Given the importance of our financial system, 
efforts to better protect our critical infrastructure from 
cyberattacks should include our financial infrastructure and its 
 
 314. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012) (establishing the Federal Depos-
it Insurance Corporation); 15 U.S.C. § 6801–09 (2012) (mandating protection 
of customer information); 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–314.5 (2002) (regulation effecting 
the statutory mandate). 
 315. ODOTE, supra note 161, at 331–37. 
 316. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 156, at 34 (highlight-
ing the importance of information sharing in cybersecurity). 
 317. Press Release, Soltra, New Soltra Network Offering To Connect and 
Coordinate Cyber Threat Sharing (Oct. 12, 2015), https://soltra.com/ 
pdf/Soltra%20Network%20Press%20Release%20101215.pdf; Threatexchange, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/threatexchange/info (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016). 
 318. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. 
(2013). 
 319. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (2013). 
 320. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRA-
STRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY 
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1 (2013). 
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key participants. And advanced technological stress tests can 
be a step in that direction.  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, large financial in-
stitutions with assets over $50 billion in the United States were 
subject to capital stress tests to assess the adequacy of their re-
serves in the event of another financial crisis.321 These financial 
institutions were subject to a host of hypothetical adverse eco-
nomic and financial scenarios to test their vulnerability and vi-
ability under certain hypothetical dire circumstances.322 These 
hypothetical nightmare scenarios include a parade of economic 
horrors like sudden drops in gross domestic product, spikes in 
unemployment, and crashes in housing prices.323 The Federal 
Reserve and the relevant financial institutions conducted these 
stress tests under the auspices of the Supervisory Capital As-
sessment Programs (SCAP), Comprehensive Capital Analysis 
and Review (CCAR), and Dodd-Frank Act stress testing 
(DFAST), which were all implemented following the financial 
crisis.324 Foreign banking regulators have also implemented 
similar stress tests for their systemically important financial 
institutions.325 These stress tests, while imperfect, can nonethe-
less provide valuable information for policymakers and tested 
financial institutions.326  
 
 321. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a) (2012) (calling for development of standards to 
apply to banks with assets in excess of $50 billion); Supervisory Stress Test 
Requirements for U.S. Bank Holding Companies with $50 Billion or More in 
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1250–51 (critiquing stress tests). 
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(2014). 
 325. See, e.g., EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., 2011 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST AG-
GREGATE REPORT 2–4 (2011) (reporting results of 2011 stress test); Andrew 
Haldane, Exec. Dir. for Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Marcus-
Evans Conference on Stress Testing: Why Banks Failed the Stress Test (Feb. 
13, 2009), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/ 
speeches/2009/speech374.pdf (describing stress testing in the United King-
dom). 
 326. See Policy Statement on Scenario Design Framework for Stress Test-
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Because the modern financial industry is essentially a 
high-tech industry, stress tests akin to those that test capital 
adequacy should be conducted to test the technological capabili-
ties and vulnerabilities of our critical financial institutions and 
agencies when subject to adverse technological situations. Simi-
lar to the capital stress tests, the detailed results of these tests 
will remain confidential so that vulnerabilities within an insti-
tution or the system are not disclosed to our adversaries. Like 
the capital stress tests, the technological stress tests will in-
clude large financial institutions like investment banks, but al-
so critically important financial infrastructure participants like 
stock exchanges, mutual funds, and clearinghouses. Additional-
ly, unlike the capital stress tests, the key financial regulators 
such as the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, the Treasury Department, and the Labor 
Department would also be subject to these technological stress 
tests because of their systemic importance and because they 
may have unknown vulnerabilities.327 In fact, in recent years, 
mindful of potential cyber breaches of confidential financial in-
formation, major financial institutions have bolstered their own 
technological defenses and have also encouraged their outside 
law firms to enhance their cybersecurity.328 Ultimately, because 
of the interconnected nature of the modern financial system 
and its heavy dependence on information technology, it is im-
perative that critical institutions are technologically well-
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systems at the Treasury Department).  
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equipped to handle technological stresses and threats from for-
eign and domestic adversaries.329  
C. WAR GAMES 
Policymakers should design comprehensive military exer-
cises that include serious threats to the American financial sys-
tem and American financial interests to better prepare for 
modern conflicts and warfare.330 These war games should mar-
shal military resources, as well as private resources to partici-
pate in these exercises. The Departments of Defense, Homeland 
Security, and Treasury can serve as the leading and coordinat-
ing agencies for these exercises that involve public agencies as 
well as private institutions. The participation of private institu-
tions is critically important to having effective war games be-
cause private firms play such an important role in the global 
financial infrastructure and in financial warfare.331 Private 
firms like banks, clearinghouses, and exchanges are at the 
frontlines of the financial theater of war, and they can certainly 
play a more active role in enhancing our national security read-
iness and our recovery capabilities.332 Just as war games have 
long assisted the military in preparing for conflict in the thea-
ters of land, air, and sea, these war games can help the military 
and private firms better prepare for conflicts in the financial 
theater of war.333 Whereas the technological stress tests are 
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primarily structured, targeted exercises, the proposed war 
games would be comprehensive operational exercises that ac-
count for analog weapons as well as cyber weapons with con-
siderably less predictability and more unintended scenarios. If 
properly designed, financial war games better prepare policy-
makers to anticipate the complexities surrounding financial 
warfare.334 
War games have long been used by militaries, here and 
abroad, to enhance readiness and national defenses.335 Early 
variations of chess date back to 3000 B.C. and were considered 
to be one of the first forms of war games.336 War games simulate 
potential threats and attacks in a semi-controlled environment 
where its participants can better learn about their strengths 
and vulnerabilities in a dynamic setting.337 During the Cold 
War, the Pentagon ran a series of hypothetical and operational 
exercises to test the efficacy of the U.S. military in connection 
to certain adverse scenarios occurring in Europe and Asia.338 
Since 1982, the United States and Thailand have spearheaded 
large-scale operational war games called Cobra Gold, which 
presently includes Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
South Korea.339 More recently, in connection with emerging 
threats posed by China and North Korea, the United States 
and South Korea also run one of the largest full-scale military 
exercises called Foal Eagle annually to test their readiness.340 
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Approximately 10,000 U.S. troops from the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Special Operations Forces were involved in the 2013 
Foal Eagle war games alone.341  
As the nature of war evolves to include more non-state ad-
versaries, cyber weapons, and analog financial weapons, the 
military must work closer with key private institutions to de-
sign war games that better prepare for attacks that attempt to 
disrupt and destroy our financial system and financial inter-
ests.342 Osama Bin Laden did not choose to attack the World 
Trade Center in New York City by accident. He chose the Twin 
Towers and New York City because of their economic and fi-
nancial importance to the United States.343 These war games 
should account for tactics like coordinated economic sanctions 
by competing nation-states, attacks to disrupt our financial in-
frastructure, efforts to manipulate our capital markets, 
schemes to decimate our economic strength, and attempts to 
physically destroy our financial institutions. Financial war 
games can help us think like the enemy.344 They can help our 
military, law enforcement, and private institutions prepare for 
terrorists using alternative funding sources like peer-to-peer 
lending, bitcoins, and crowdfunding to finance their activities.345 
Financial war games can also help our military prepare for hor-
rific scenarios like the seizure of American banking interests 
abroad, the commandeering of the New York Stock Exchange 
servers, the injection of false data into our bond markets, a 
sudden, massive sale of U.S. Treasury bonds, and the bombing 
of major investment banks in New York. Through significantly 
realistic simulated scenarios, war games can provide incredibly 
valuable intelligence to public policymakers and private firms 
of their strengths and vulnerabilities.346  
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This proposal for comprehensive operational financial war 
games that includes private and public sector actors is not en-
tirely unprecedented. Mindful of the utility of war games in 
connection with financial weapons, in 2009, the U.S. military 
and intelligence officials conducted one of the first reported 
economic war games at the Johns Hopkins University Warfare 
Analysis Laboratory in Laurel, Maryland, to test the use of fi-
nancial weapons against the United States by a foreign nation 
like China.347 Recent efforts like the National Cyber-Forensics 
& Training Alliance, a non-profit corporation established by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to marshal public and private 
sector resources to share information, expertise, and resources 
to combat threats to cybersecurity, may serve as a good model 
for designing more comprehensive financial war games.348 Since 
2011, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associa-
tion has been running major cyberattack simulations called 
Quantum Dawn with private partners and federal agencies to 
better prepare the financial industry against a systemic 
cyberattack.349  
While no war game can perfectly simulate an actual war, a 
good war game can nonetheless be incredibly illuminating in 
helping public and private institutions better plan for financial 
warfare, so that they do not react in a rash, ad-hoc manner dur-
ing times of crisis.350 As former President and General Dwight 
Eisenhower famously remarked about war preparations: “In 
preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, 
but planning is indispensable.”351 To date, it is difficult to say 
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that we cannot plan better, or do more, to protect our homeland 
and our financial interests from potential and persistent at-
tacks from our enemies with financial weapons of war.352 And 
comprehensive financial war games that marshal public and 
private resources in design and operation can serve as a mean-
ingful early step towards creating better defenses against cyber 
weapons and analog weapons in modern financial warfare.353  
  CONCLUSION   
Financial warfare will be one of the most pressing chal-
lenges for political leaders, military commanders, financial 
regulators, and corporate executives in the near future. The 
emergence and confluence of analog and cyber financial weap-
ons will pose some of the most vexing and daunting threats for 
law and society in the coming years. Every nation-state, every 
major financial institution, and every citizen could be at risk of 
suffering direct harms and collateral damage. 
This Article provides an early exploration of modern finan-
cial warfare. It examines the new battlefield of the modern fi-
nancial infrastructure, classifies the growing arsenal of finan-
cial weapons, highlights emerging legal and policy tensions, 
and offers three pragmatic recommendations for better safe-
guarding the homeland and the global financial system in cur-
rent and future financial wars. Throughout its analysis, this 
Article is mindful of the longstanding international legal con-
siderations involved with war and finance, but it is also aware 
of the critical need for swift and thoughtful actions to better 
protect American interests. In the end, this Article aspires to 
serve as an early, optimistic blueprint for further study on how 
best to think and act anew with urgency about modern finan-
cial warfare and the financial weapons of war. 
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